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Zhuangzi,	  perspectives,	  and	  greater	  knowledge*	  Donald	  Sturgeon	  PhD	  candidate,	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  	  Although	   the	   text	   of	   the	   Zhuangzi1	  seems	   to	   present	  many	   prima	   facie	   skeptical	  arguments,	  there	  has	  been	  much	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  skeptical	  stance,	  and	  even	  whether	  or	  not	  its	  stance	  is	  substantively	  skeptical	  at	  all.2	  Chad	  Hansen	  and	  Chris	  Fraser	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  does	  take	  a	  substantively	  skeptical	  position,	  but	  that	  this	  position	   is	   more	   nuanced	   than	   simply	   holding	   skepticism	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   all	  knowledge.3 This	  paper	  will	  attempt	  to	  build	  upon	  Chris	  Fraser’s	  proposal	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  skeptical	   about	   our	   ability	   to	   know	   a	   privileged	   class	   of	   ultimately	   correct	   ways	   of	  drawing	  distinctions	  (果是	  guo	  shi	  and	  果非	  guo	  fei),	  but	  does	  not	  question	  our	  ability	  to	  know	  how	  to	  distinguish	  things	  in	  an	  ordinary,	  provisional	  and	  commonsense	  sense.	  I	  will	  attempt	   to	   engage	  with	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   debate,	   by	   firstly	   accepting	   that	   the	  Zhuangzi	  takes	   a	   substantive	   skeptical	   stance,	   but	   also	   arguing	   that	   in	   doing	   so	   the	   text	   also	  provides	  a	  positive	  account	  of	  how	  to	  improve	  our	  epistemic	  position	  –	  an	  account	  which	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Forthcoming	  in	  Philosophy	  East	  and	  West	  65:3.	  1	  This	  paper	  will	  focus	  on	  knowledge	  and	  skepticism	  in	  the	  anthology	  known	  as	  the	  
Zhuangzi,	  beginning	  with	  ideas	  presented	  most	  clearly	  in	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter,	  but	  will	  also	  consider	  how	  these	  ideas	  cohere	  with	  those	  presented	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  anthology	  –	  including	  in	  passages	  that	  may	  be	  later	  additions	  to	  the	  text	  by	  one	  or	  more	  distinct	  authors	  or	  editors.	  Even	  where	  this	  is	  so,	  it	  still	  seems	  useful	  to	  ask	  how	  –	  if	  at	  all	  –	  these	  ideas	  fit	  together,	  and	  why	  they	  might	  have	  been	  collected	  together	  in	  such	  an	  anthology.	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  term	  “Zhuangist”	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  broadly	  coherent	  set	  of	  ideas	  I	  identify	  in	  this	  paper	  –	  within	  which	  there	  may	  be	  some	  scope	  for	  variation	  –	  without	  meaning	  to	  suggest	  that	  these	  ideas	  are	  uniformly	  endorsed	  by	  all	  passages	  of	  the	  entire	  anthology.	  2	  E.g.	  Wong	  2005,	  Ivanhoe	  1993.	  3	  Hansen	  2003,	  Fraser	  2009.	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might	   be	   suggestive	   of	   one	   motivating	   factor	   of	   the	   Zhuangist	   ethical	   stance.4 	  My	  argument	  will	   focus	   on	  Zhuangist	   attitudes	   to	  different	   types	   of	   knowledge,	   specifically	  what	  the	  text	  refers	  to	  as	  “lesser	  knowledge	  (小知	  xiao	  zhi)”	  and	  “greater	  knowledge	  (大
知	  da	  zhi)”,	   and	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   two.	   I	  will	   attempt	   to	   show	   that,	   far	   from	  promoting	  “epistemological	  nihilism”,5	  the	  Zhuangist	  stance	  is	  actually	  that	  of	  a	  “positive	  skeptic”	   who	   can	   offer	   wide-­‐ranging	   practical	   advice	   on	   how	   to	   improve	   our	   own	  epistemic	  situation,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  warning	  us	  of	  the	  ultimate	  limits	  of	  what	  we	  can	  come	  to	  know.6	  
 
Skeptical	  background	  	  	   A	   radically	   skeptical	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Zhuangzi	   faces	   serious	   obstacles.	   It	   is	  certainly	   true	   that	  many	   stories	   in	   the	  Zhuangzi	   present	   characters	  we	   are	  presumably	  expected	   to	   empathize	   with	   questioning	   whether	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   know	   something.	  However,	   these	   arguments	   generally	   proceed	   from	   assumptions	   that	   it	   seems	   all	  characters	  in	  the	  story	  presuppose	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  take	  as	  being	  known	  and	  therefore	  knowable.	  Is	  the	  Zhuangzi	  guilty	  of	  committing	  the	  fallacy	  which	  the	  Mohists	  accuse	  it	  of,	  “declaring	  all	  doctrine	  perverse”	  –	  itself	  a	  perverse	  doctrine?7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  This	  paper	  therefore	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  “strike	  out	  in	  another	  direction”	  as	  suggested	  in	  Wong	  2005,	  p.97-­‐98.	  5	  Soles	  and	  Soles	  1998,	  p.161.	  6	  Since	  I	  submitted	  this	  paper	  for	  publication,	  a	  paper	  taking	  a	  broadly	  similar	  line	  of	  interpretation	  on	  “greater	  knowledge”	  and	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  has	  been	  published	  elsewhere	  (Tim	  Connolly,	  2011,	  “Perspectivism	  as	  a	  Way	  of	  Knowing	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi”,	  
Dao:	  A	  Journal	  of	  Comparative	  Philosophy,	  10,	  487-­‐505).	  Although	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  respond	  to	  it	  here,	  I	  think	  that	  Connolly’s	  interpretation	  is	  largely	  compatible	  with	  the	  one	  I	  offer,	  and	  I	  recommend	  it	  to	  the	  interested	  reader.	  7	  Mozi:	  67/41/21,	  74/43/82-­‐83.	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The	  work	  of	  Hansen	  and	  Fraser	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  The	  Zhuangzi	  is	  not	  skeptical	  about	  ordinary	  contingent	  knowledge	  claims	  as	  they	  apply	  from	  particular	  circumstances	  and	  perspectives.8	  No	  doubt	  is	  expressed	  about	  whether	  “monkeys	  live	  in	  trees”,	   or	   what	   “monkeys”	   are;	   rather,	   the	   skeptical	   doubts	   apply	   to	   knowledge	   of	  absolutely	   or	   ultimately	   correct	   action-­‐guiding	   distinctions.	   This	   limiting	   of	   skeptical	  doubt	  to	  a	  narrower	  scope	  than	  that	  of	  all	  knowledge	  claims	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi	  avoiding	   the	   obvious	   criticism	   of	   a	   claim	   to	   know	   that	   nothing	   is	   knowable	   –	   namely,	  “then	  how	  do	  you	  know	  that?”9 
	  
Perspectives	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  	   The	   Zhuangzi	   is	   sometimes	   described	   as	   taking	   up	   a	   perspectivist	   position;10	  in	  order	   to	   avoid	   possible	   confusion,	   I	   will	   first	   attempt	   to	   clarify	   what	   I	   mean	   by	  “perspectives”,	  and	  in	  what	  sense	  I	  think	  they	  are	  important	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi.11	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  References	  to	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  and	  Mozi	  cite	  page,	  section,	  and	  line	  numbers	  in	  the	  appropriate	  volume	  of	  the	  Harvard-­‐Yenching	  concordance	  series;	  references	  to	  all	  other	  texts	  cite	  section,	  page,	  and	  line	  numbers	  in	  the	  corresponding	  ICS	  concordance.	  Locations	  in	  the	  text	  of	  all	  the	  textual	  references	  given	  in	  this	  paper	  can	  also	  be	  determined	  using	  the	  Chinese	  Text	  Project	  website	  concordance	  tool:	  http://ctext.org/tools/concordance	  8	  Hansen	  2003,	  p.	  145;	  Fraser	  2009,	  p.446.	  9	  A	  number	  of	  commentators	  on	  the	  Zhuangzi	  take	  this	  line	  of	  criticism	  as	  showing	  that	  skepticism	  is	  self-­‐refuting	  or	  incoherent	  (see	  Hansen	  2003,	  p.155	  note	  4).	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  obviously	  incoherent	  or	  self-­‐refuting	  about	  being	  skeptical	  of	  some	  types	  of	  knowledge,	  yet	  not	  skeptical	  about	  others	  (Fraser	  2009,	  p.	  441-­‐442).	  10	  E.g.	  Ivanhoe	  1993,	  p.645;	  Hansen	  2002,	  p.150.	  11	  My	  core	  focus	  here	  will	  be	  on	  suggestions	  made	  about	  knowledge	  in	  the	  Qiwulun	  and	  how	  these	  cohere	  with	  other	  ideas	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  –	  this	  may	  include	  ideas	  and	  passages	  that	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  later	  additions	  to	  the	  text	  by	  subsequent	  authors	  or	  editors.	  Even	  where	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  certain	  passages	  are	  of	  later	  authorship,	  and	  even	  assuming	  that	  this	  can	  be	  reliably	  determined	  in	  specific	  cases,	  it	  still	  seems	  useful	  to	  ask	  how	  –	  if	  at	  all	  –	  the	  ideas	  in	  these	  passages	  fit	  together,	  and	  why	  they	  might	  become	  lumped	  together	  in	  an	  anthology	  such	  as	  the	  Zhuangzi.	  In	  the	  discussion	  below,	  I	  shall	  use	  the	  term	  “Zhuangist”	  to	  refer	  to	  ideas	  that	  I	  shall	  argue	  constitute	  a	  recurring	  theme	  throughout	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Broadly	   speaking,	   by	   perspective	   I	   mean	   some	   set	   of	   background	   assumptions,	  cognitive	  and	  affective	  attitudes,	  physical	  and	  psychological	  states	  which	  have	  a	  bearing	  upon	  how	  one	  thinks,	   feels,	  and	  acts.	   In	  particular,	   in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  we	  often	  find	  stories	  relating	   to	   one	   of	   two	   related	   types	   of	   perspective	   in	   this	   broad	   sense.	   Firstly,	   there	   is	  perspective	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   “being	   in	   someone	   else’s	   (or	   one’s	   own)	   shoes”	   –	   thinking	  about	  a	  situation	  as	   it	  would	  be	   if	  one	  were	   in	   fact	  someone	  else,	   i.e.	  were	   in	  his	  or	  her	  physical	  and	  psychological	  state.	  For	  example,	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  monkey	  would	  be	  the	  view	   of	   the	   world	   that	   I	   would	   likely	   have	   if	   I	   were	   in	   fact	   a	   monkey.	   In	   this	   case	  understanding	   a	   perspective	   usually	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   a	   counterfactual	   –	   if	   I	   were	   in	  someone	   else’s	   position,	   what	   would	   I	   think	   about	   some	   particular	   matter	   at	   hand.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  also	  the	  sense	  of	  thinking	  about	  some	  situation	  while	  primarily	  paying	  attention	  to	  some	  particular	  aspect	  of	  it.	  For	  example	  the	  “perspective	  of	  utility”	  would	  be	  the	  view	  of	  the	  world	  (or	  more	  specifically	  some	  particular	  matter	  under	  consideration)	  that	   I	  would	  have	   if	   I	  placed	  emphasis	  primarily	  upon	   the	  matter	  of	   “utility”.	  Again	   this	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  counterfactual	  –	  how	  I	  would	  see	  things	  if	  I	  were	  to	  consider	  primarily	  some	  particular	  aspect	  of	  a	  situation,	  which	  I	  may	  or	  may	  not	  in	  fact	  consider	  important.	  	   Perspectives	   in	   both	   these	   senses	   are	   a	   recurring	   theme	   in	   the	   Zhuangzi.	   Often	  those	  who	  view	  matters	  from	  a	  narrow,	  close-­‐minded	  perspective	  appear	  to	  be	  mocked	  or	  ridiculed	  as	   failing	   to	   see	   something	   important	  –	   the	  small	  bird	   that	   laughs	  at	   the	  giant	  Peng	   bird’s	   long	   journeys	  without	   seeing	   that	   from	   the	   Peng’s	   perspective	   the	   flight	   of	  little	  birds	  must	  seem	  laughably	  inconsequential,	  and	  the	  preconceived	  notions	  of	  people	  such	   as	   Zi-­‐chan	   who,	   seeing	   that	   a	   person	   is	   deformed	   or	   crippled,	   focus	   only	   on	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  much	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi;	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  claim	  that	  these	  ideas	  –	  or	  the	  textual	  passages	  that	  I	  cite	  –	  constitute	  the	  work	  of	  a	  single	  author.	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negative	  aspects	  of	  his	   situation	  and	   so	  assume	  he	  must	  be	   lacking	  virtuosity	   (德	  de).12	  Typically	   such	   cases	   are	   those	   in	   which	   one	   is	   seen	   as	   appreciating	   only	   one’s	   own	  perspective	   and	   ignoring	   the	   possibility	   of	   distinct	   but	   somehow	   closely	   related	  perspectives,	   the	   consideration	   of	   which	   might	   be	   of	   value	   to	   oneself	   either	   in	   better	  understanding	   the	   world	   or	   in	   interacting	   with	   it	   successfully.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  
Zhuangzi	   seems	   to	   be	   making	   a	   criticism	   similar	   that	   that	   of	   the	   Xunzi,	   in	   saying	   that	  people	  are	  easily	  misled	  or	  “blinkered”	  by	  one	  aspect	  of	  things.	  Nonetheless,	  from	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  and	  particularly	  the	  numerous	  stories	  in	  which	  an	  unexpected	  or	  unusual	  perspective	   is	  pointed	  out	  as	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	   looking	  at	   things,	   it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	   Zhuangzi	   does	   not	   see	   engagement	  with	   the	  world	   from	   particular	   perspectives	   as	  being	   inherently	   epistemically	   or	   ethically	  misguided.	  Unlike	   the	  Xunzi,	  which	   seems	   to	  consider	  perspectives	  as	  primarily	  being	  a	  cause	  of	  blinkering,13	  the	  Zhuangzi,	   though	   it	  acknowledges	   perspectives	   can	   cause	   such	   blinkering,	   also	   accepts	   that	   in	   reality,	  ordinary	  beings	  inevitably	  see	  the	  world	  from	  some	  perspective.14	  Most	  obviously,	  we	  see	  the	  world	  from	  our	  own	  perspective;	  but	  also,	  as	  the	  Zhuangzi	  seems	  to	  be	  encouraging	  us	  to	  do,	  we	  can	  consider	  how	  the	  world	  might	  be	  from	  other	  perspectives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  De	  Chong	  Fu	  chapter	  gives	  several	  examples	  challenging	  such	  assumptions:	  Wang	  Tai,	  whose	  feet	  had	  been	  cut	  off	  yet	  had	  more	  followers	  than	  Confucius	  (12/5/1-­‐6);	  Shen	  Tu	  Jia,	  whose	  feet	  had	  also	  been	  cut	  off,	  yet	  appears	  to	  convince	  Zi-­‐chan	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  take	  his	  outward	  appearance	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  virtuousity	  (13/5/13-­‐24);	  “toeless”	  Shu	  Shan,	  who	  is	  initially	  overlooked	  by	  Confucius	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  appearance,	  then	  praised	  by	  him,	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  diagnose	  Confucius’	  failings	  in	  a	  discussion	  with	  Lao	  Dan	  (13/5/24-­‐31);	  and	  the	  ugly	  yet	  charismatic	  Ai	  Tai	  Tuo	  who	  attracts	  the	  devotion	  of	  all	  those	  around	  him	  (13/5/31-­‐14/5/43).	  13	  The	  Xunzi	  diagnoses	  the	  failures	  of	  a	  list	  of	  thinkers	  including	  Mozi,	  Huizi,	  and	  Zhuangzi,	  each	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  being	  blinkered	  by	  some	  particular	  perspective	  (21/103/8-­‐9).	  He	  contrasts	  this	  with	  Confucius,	  who	  was	  “benevolent	  and	  wise,	  and	  not	  blinkered”	  (21/103/15).	  14	  Though	  the	  “pivot	  of	  the	  Dao”	  (道樞	  dao	  shu)	  discussed	  in	  the	  Qiwulun	  chapter	  seems	  to	  challenge	  this	  assumption	  by	  suggesting	  that	  one	  can	  endlessly	  choose	  among	  available	  perspectives,	  ultimately	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  act,	  we	  commit	  ourselves	  to	  some	  particular	  perspective.	  To	  refuse	  to	  take	  up	  any	  perspective	  on	  anything	  would	  seemingly	  not	  be	  possible	  in	  any	  recognizably	  human	  way	  of	  life.	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Knowledge	  and	  wisdom	  	  	   Before	  entering	  into	  a	  discussion	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  it	  seems	  useful	  to	  note	   a	   few	   points	   about	   the	   word	   “knowledge”	   as	   it	   appears	   in	   the	   text.	   Firstly,	   in	  transmitted	  texts	  of	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  period,	  the	  words	  which	  later	  came	  to	  be	  distinguished	  as	  “知 (knowledge)”	   and	   “智 (wisdom)”	   were	   both	   commonly	   written	   using	   the	   same	  character	   “知	   (zhi)”,	   and	   very	   likely	   shared	   the	   same	   pronunciation.15	  Secondly,	   on	   the	  pre-­‐Qin	   conception	   of	   knowledge,	   generally	   no	   clear	   category	   distinction	   was	   made	  between	   knowing-­‐of,	   knowing-­‐that,	   and	   knowing-­‐how.	   Relatedly,	   the	   word	   “知”	   could	  take	  many	   things	   as	   its	   direct	   object,	   including	   a	   person	   or	   thing	   which	   one	  might	   be	  acquainted	  with	  (“to	  know	  Confucius”,	  “to	  know	  black	  and	  white”),	  the	  holding	  of	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  (“to	  know	  that	  black	  is	  not	  white”),	  or	  an	  ability	  which	  one	  might	  or	  might	  not	  possess	   (“to	   know	   how	   to	   ride	   a	   bike”).16	  Whereas	   in	   English	   these	   differences	   are	  suggested	  by	  surface	  grammar	  (e.g.	  “know	  that”	  versus	  “know	  how”),	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  classical	  Chinese.17	  Thirdly,	  knowledge	  was	  conceived	  of	  as	  being	  intimately	  connected	  with	  action,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  failing	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  in	  some	  particular	  situation	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  conclusive	  evidence	  not	  only	  that	  one	  did	  not	  know	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  act	   in	  that	  situation,	  but	  even	  that	  one	  did	  not	  know	  the	  relevant	  concept	   involved	  or	  how	  to	  distinguish	  it.	  Thus	  on	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  conception	  of	  knowledge,	  it	  would	  make	  perfect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  E.g.	  Bernhard	  Karlgren,	  Grammata	  Serica	  Recensa,	  entry	  863.	  16	  Numerous	  examples	  of	  each	  are	  available	  in	  pre-­‐Qin	  texts,	  for	  instance:	  “晏子知禮乎”	  (Han	  Shi	  Wai	  Zhuan:	  4.12/28/26);	  “知是之非此也”	  (Mozi:	  71/43/37);	  “古之民未知為舟車
時”	  (Mozi:	  7/6/27).	  17	  Christoph	  Harbsmeier	  (1993,	  p.15-­‐16)	  points	  out	  that	  there	  are	  grammatical	  differences	  in	  what	  follows	  zhi	  when	  it	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  “know-­‐that”	  and	  “know-­‐how”;	  however,	  these	  differences	  are	  considerably	  more	  subtle	  than	  in	  English	  where	  words	  “that”	  and	  “how”	  often	  appear	  as	  markers.	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sense	   to	   say	   simply	   that	   a	  wise	   person	  was	   one	  who	   possessed	   knowledge,18	  a	   person	  who	   knew	   a	   great	   deal,	   because	   being	   knowledgeable	   would	   in	   itself	   entail	   that	   the	  person	  acted	  in	  a	  wise	  manner	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  situations.	  Being	  wise	  is	   just	  knowing	  many	   things,	   where	   “knowing”	   is	   understood	   in	   the	   expanded	   sense	   which	   implicitly	  includes	  guiding	  one’s	  action.	  	   As	  a	  result,	  while	   it	   is	   tempting	  to	   try	   to	  clarify	  each	   instance	  of	   “知”	  as	  meaning	  either	  “knowledge”	  or	  “wisdom”,	  and	  indeed	  there	  may	  be	  clear	  cases	  where	  only	  one	  of	  the	   two	   would	   make	   sense	   or	   seem	   appropriate	   in	   translation,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	  introducing	  confusion	  by	  using	  different	  translations	  for	  the	  same	  Chinese	  character,	  the	  following	  discussion	   in	  will	   translate	   “知”	  consistently	  as	   “knowledge”,	  with	   the	  proviso	  that	  this	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  meaning	  “knowledge	  (知)”	  in	  the	  sense	  pre-­‐Qin	  thinkers	  took	   it	   to	   be	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   narrower	  Western	   conception	   of	   propositional	   or	   other	  knowledge.	  Particularly	  in	  cases	  where	  “知”	  is	  used	  non-­‐verbally,	  it	  is	  often	  the	  case	  that	  either	  translation	  would	  make	  equally	  good	  sense.	  	  
	  
Improving	  our	  epistemic	  situation	  	   In	   what	   follows	   I	   adapt	   the	   terminology	   of	   “epistemic	   situation”	   or	   “epistemic	  position”	  from	  DeRose’s	  discussion	  of	  contextualism,	  for	  a	  broadly	  similar	  purpose	  –	  that	  is,	  in	  order	  to	  talk	  about	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  knowledge,	  without	  committing	  to	  any	  particular	  account	  of	  what	   these	   conditions	  actually	  might	  be.	   In	  DeRose’s	   terminology,	  “To	  be	  in	  a	  strong	  epistemic	  position	  with	  respect	  to	  some	  proposition	  one	  believes	  is	  for	  one’s	   belief	   in	   that	   proposition	   to	   have	   to	   a	   high	   extent	   the	   property	   or	   properties	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  Mengzi	  claims,	  using	  “知”	  in	  what	  we	  might	  say	  were	  the	  two	  senses	  of	  “wisdom”	  and	  “knowledge”:	  “知者無不知也”	  (Mengzi:	  13.46/72/31). 
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having	   enough	   of	   which	   is	   what’s	   needed	   for	   a	   true	   belief	   to	   constitute	   a	   piece	   of	  knowledge.”19	  My	  use	  of	  the	  term	  attempts	  to	  extend	  this	  to	  all	  knowledge	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  sense:	   being	   in	   a	   strong	   epistemic	   position	  with	   respect	   to	   some	   potentially	   knowable	  thing	  is	  to	  have	  to	  a	  high	  extent	  the	  property	  or	  properties	  the	  having	  enough	  of	  which	  is	  what’s	   needed	   for	   one	   to	   know	   it.	   By	   “potentially	   knowable	   thing”,	   I	   mean	   merely	  anything	  that	  can	  function	  as	  the	  direct	  object	  of	  “知	  zhi”	  –	  for	  example	  a	  kind	  term,	  a	  state	  of	   affairs,	   or	   an	   ability	   –	   in	   contrast	   to	   DeRose’s	   use	   in	  which	   an	   epistemic	   position	   is	  always	  considered	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  proposition.	  Intuitively,	  then,	  epistemic	  position	  refers	  to	  how	  well	  a	  person	  knows	  some	  thing;	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  knowledge	  a	  person	  possesses	  at	  a	  particular	  time	  –	  how	  well	  he	  knows	  –	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  quantity,	  or	  the	  number	  of	  things	  he	  knows	  (insofar	  as	  this	  might	  be	  quantifiable).	  With	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  conception	  of	  knowledge	   in	  mind,	   there	  are	  various	  dimensions	  in	  which	  one’s	  epistemic	  position	  at	  time	  A	  might	  be	  better	  than	  that	   at	   time	   B;	   these	   include	   knowing	   something	   with	   greater	   justification,	   knowing	  something	  in	  greater	  detail	  or	  clarity,	  and	  having	  greater	  practical	  success	  with	  respect	  to	  something.	  Strength	   of	   justification	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	   obvious	   way	   in	   which	   a	   person’s	  epistemic	   situation	   might	   change.	   For	   example,	   having	   heard	   repeatedly	   from	   mutual	  acquaintances	   that	  my	  co-­‐worker	   Jones	  owns	  a	  Ford,	   I	  might	  come	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  those	  properties	  needed	  for	  me	  to	  know	  that	  he	  does	  indeed	  own	  one;	  but	  my	  epistemic	   situation	  with	   respect	   to	  my	   tentative	   belief	   that	   “Jones	   owns	   a	   Ford”	  would	  surely	   be	   strengthened	   further	   if	   I	  were	   to	   see	   him	  driving	   a	   new	  Ford	   about	   town,	   or	  were	  he	  to	  show	  me	  a	  receipt	  from	  the	  car	  dealership.	  Presumably,	  radical	  skepticism	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  DeRose	  2009,	  p.7.	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Gettier	   cases	   aside,	   there	  would	   come	   a	   point	   at	  which	   I	  would	   be	   in	   a	   strong	   enough	  epistemic	  position	  for	  me	  to	  know	  that	  Jones	  owns	  a	  Ford.	  A	   second	  dimension	   in	  which	   one	   epistemic	   position	   can	  be	   superior	   to	   another	  relates	  to	  the	  detail	  or	  depth	  of	  our	  knowledge.	  	  This	  factor	  is	  especially	  relevant	  to	  pre-­‐Qin	  ideas	  of	  knowledge	  because	  “to	  know	  X”	  where	  X	  is	  a	  noun	  was	  such	  a	  common	  use	  of	  “know”.	  On	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  conception	  of	  knowledge,	  if	  I	  know	  tables,	  then	  I	  must	  be	  able	  to	  distinguish	   tables	   from	  non-­‐tables	   in	   a	   reliable	   fashion;	   but	   even	   given	   that	   I	   have	   this	  ability,	   there	   remains	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   uncertainty	   regarding	  how	  well	   I	   know	   tables.	   To	  avoid	   accusations	   of	   “not	   knowing	   X”,	   I	   need	   not	   only	   to	   be	   able	   to	   distinguish	   things	  which	  are	  X	   from	  things	  which	  are	  not,	  but	  also	   to	  have	  some	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  interact	  correctly	  with	  X;	  not	  merely	  to	  be	   in	  possession	  of	  a	   functional	  description	  of	  X	  (“tables	  are	  hard	  raised	   flat	   surfaces	   for	  writing	  and	  putting	   things	  on”),	  but	   to	  actually	  interact	  with	  them	  correctly:	  to	  know	  that	  tables	  are	  used	  for	  writing	  on	  (and	  therefore,	  on	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  conception	  of	  knowledge,	  to	  use	  them	  as	  such	  when	  appropriate);	  to	  know	  that	  tables	  are	  used	  for	  putting	  things	  on;	  to	  know	  that	  tables	  are	  generally	  used	  with	  the	  hard	  flat	  surface	  facing	  upwards,	  and	  so	  on.	  Although	  there	  is	  presumably	  some	  minimum	  standard	  above	  which	  one	  would	  not	  normally	  be	  accused	  of	  not	  knowing	  X,	   there	   still	  may	  be	  room	  for	  knowing	  X	  better	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  knowing	  more	  about	  X.	  Possession	  of	  other	   knowledge,	   not	   necessarily	   propositional	   knowledge,	   may	   also	   contribute	   to	  “better”	  knowledge	   in	   this	   sense:	  an	  accomplished	  carpenter	  undoubtedly	  knows	   tables	  better	  than	  the	  casual	  table-­‐user.	  This	  idea	  of	  depth	  of	  knowledge	  may	  also	  be	  extensible	  to	  propositional	  knowledge	  in	   interesting	   ways.	   Consider	   the	   claim	   to	   knowledge	   that	   the	   Earth	   is	   flat,	   versus	   the	  claim	   to	   knowledge	   that	   the	   Earth	   is	   round.	   Although	   a	   straightforward	   purely	  propositional	  account	  of	  knowledge	  might	  argue	  that	  the	  former	  simply	  is	  not	  knowledge	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but	  a	  once	  widely-­‐held	  untrue	  belief,	  while	  the	  latter	  may	  indeed	  be	  genuine	  knowledge,	  there	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  respect	  in	  which	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  refinement	  of	  the	  former	  rather	  than	   a	   straightforward	   denial	   of	   it.	   The	   claim	   that	   the	   Earth	   is	   round	   is	   implicitly	  understood	  as	  building	  on	  our	  commonsense	  understanding	  that	  the	  Earth	  as	  we	  see	  it	  in	  our	  everyday	  experience	  is	   flat;	  rather	  than	  denying	  that	  this	   is	   in	  any	  sense	  the	  case,	   it	  leads	  us	   to	  accept	   that	   from	  another	  perspective,	  namely	   that	  of	   a	  greater	  distance,	   the	  Earth	  is	  round.	  From	  an	  even	  further	  off	  perspective,	  it	  might	  be	  that	  the	  Earth	  is	  simply	  a	  point	  in	  space.	  All	  three	  of	  these	  claims	  are	  approximations,	  which	  are	  valid	  only	  from	  a	  certain	   range	  of	  perspectives	  –	   strictly	   speaking,	   the	  Earth	   is	  no	  more	  absolutely	   round	  than	   it	   is	   absolutely	   flat.	   Knowledge	   of	   any	   one	   of	   these	   three	   claims	   seems,	   in	   some	  important	  respect,	  to	  be	  less	  good	  than	  an	  understanding	  of	  all	  of	  them	  combined	  –	  and	  less	  good	  again	  than	  this	  together	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  limitations	  shared	  by	  all	  three.	   In	  skill	  knowledge	  too,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  knowing	  more	  or	  less	  well	   in	  a	   further	  dimension	   to	   that	  of	  greater	   justification	  or	  depth,	  namely,	   that	  of	  how	  well	  we	  are	  able	   to	  perform	   the	   skill	   in	  practice.	  A	   competent	  bicycle	   rider	  knows	  cycling	   better	   than	   a	   child	   riding	   for	   the	   first	   time,	   and	   though	   a	   professional	   cyclist	  knows	  it	  better	  than	  either	  of	  them,	  professional-­‐level	  skill	  is	  not	  required	  for	  us	  to	  accept	  that	  someone	  knows	  how	  to	  ride	  a	  bike.	  Thus	  it	  appears	  that	  for	  all	  of	  these	  various	  types	  of	  “knowing”	  involved	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  concept	  of	  “zhi”,	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  knowing	  more	  or	  less	  well,	  and	  it	  seems	  that	  our	  epistemic	  position	  needs	  to	  reach	  some	  minimum	  standard	  for	  us	  to	  avoid	  accusations	  of	  not	  knowing.	  	  
Greater	  knowledge	  and	  lesser	  knowledge	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  If	  the	  substantive	  skeptical	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  correct,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  of	  some	  sort	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  knowledge	  –	  the	  kind	  we	  can	  hope	  to	  attain,	  and	  the	  kind	  we	  should	  be	  skeptical	  about.	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  is	  committed	  to	  the	  position	  that	  there	  are	  some	  things	  we	  can	  know	  –	  perhaps	  what	  things	  are	  appropriate	  for	  me	  to	  take	  as	  “contingently	  so”	  in	  a	  particular	  circumstance,	  such	  as	  that	  monkeys	  live	  in	  trees	  –	  and	  some	  things	  we	  cannot	  –	  for	  example,	  what	  the	  uniquely	  right	   place	   to	   live	   is	   –	   then	  we	   should	   not	   be	   surprised	   if	   we	   find	   evidence	   of	   tension	  between	   these	   two	   types	   of	   knowledge,	   both	   of	   which	   seem	   to	   be	   referred	   to	   in	   the	  
Zhuangzi	  as	  “知”.	  Although	  this	  tension	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  Zhuangist	  position,	  an	  obvious	  question	  is	  how	  are	  these	  two	  types	  of	  knowledge	  related,	  and	  why	  is	  one	  kind	  purportedly	  unattainable?	  	   In	   several	   places	   in	   the	   Zhuangzi,	   an	   explicit	   distinction	   and	   contrast	   is	   made	  between	   “greater	   knowledge	   (大知	   da	   zhi)”	   and	   “lesser	   knowledge	   (小知	   xiao	   zhi)”.	  Firstly,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Xiaoyaoyou	   chapter,	   a	   contrast	   is	   made	   between	   the	  morning	  mushroom	  and	  short-­‐lived	  cicada,	  and	  the	  “Da-­‐chun”,	  whose	  autumn	  and	  spring	  each	   lasted	   8000	   years,	   and	   long-­‐lived	   Peng	   Zu.	   One	   claim	   that	   is	   made	   is,	   to	   give	   an	  overly	  literal	  translation,	  “small	  knowledge	  does	  not	  reach	  large	  knowledge;	  small	  years	  do	  not	  reach	  large	  years”,	  which	  I	  interpret	  as	  claiming	  that	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  does	  not	  reach	   “greater	   knowledge”,	   and	   “shorter	   lives”	   do	   not	   reach	   “longer	   lives”.20	  From	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  Chinese	  text	  reads:	  “小知不及大知，小年不及大年”	  (1/1/10).	  There	  is	  a	  considerable	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  and	  scope	  for	  differing	  interpretations	  of	  this	  sentence.	  From	  the	  parallelism	  between	  “小知不及大知”	  and	  “小年不及大年”	  as	  well	  as	  the	  examples	  of	  short-­‐lived	  beings	  that	  follow,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  “小”	  and	  “大”	  in	  both	  sentences	  should	  be	  taken	  as	  modifying	  “知”	  and	  “年”,	  rather	  than	  acting	  as	  subject	  (i.e.	  simply	  meaning	  “the	  small”	  and	  “the	  large”).	  This	  interpretation	  is	  further	  supported	  by	  the	  other	  instances	  of	  “小知”	  and	  “大知”	  outlined	  below,	  which	  do	  not	  exhibit	  this	  type	  of	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context	  of	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  passage,	   it	   seems	  clear	   that	  part	  of	   the	  claim	   is	   that	  creatures	  with	  short	  life-­‐spans	  cannot	  know	  of	  things	  which	  lie	  beyond	  their	  existence	  –	  a	  summer	  cicada	  simply	  cannot	  know	  autumn	  or	  winter	  –	  and	  so,	  in	  this	  sense,	  those	  with	  a	  longer	  life-­‐span	   can	   come	   to	   possess	   knowledge	   inaccessible	   to	   those	   with	   shorter	   lives.	  Interestingly,	   there	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   necessarily	  better	   to	   come	   to	  know	  more	  things	  –	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  longer	  life	  in	  general	  gives	  one	  the	  opportunity	  of	  knowing	  more	  things	  than	  a	  shorter	  one.	  	   Secondly,	   the	  Qiwulun	   makes	   another	   comparison	   between	   “greater	   knowledge”	  and	   “lesser	   knowledge”;21	  and	   although	   the	   precise	  meaning	   of	   this	   claim	   is	  much	   less	  clear,	   most	   interpreters	   take	   it	   as	   saying	   that	   “greater	   knowledge”	   is	   wide	   and	  encompassing,	  while	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  is	  small,	  narrow,	  or	  petty.22	  This	  interpretation	  is	  supported	   by	   the	  Xiaoyaoyou	   passage,	   since	   knowledge	   gained	   over	   a	   greater	   range	   of	  experiences	  ought	  generally	  to	  be	  broader	   in	  some	  sense	  than	  knowledge	  gained	  over	  a	  smaller	  range.	  	   Thirdly,	  in	  the	  Waiwu	  chapter,	  the	  Zhuangzi	  points	  out	  how	  even	  the	  superbly	  wise	  spirit-­‐tortoise,	  which	  through	  its	  knowledge	  was	  able	  show	  itself	  to	  the	  ruler	  of	  Song	  in	  a	  dream23 	  and	   divine	   72	   times	   without	   error,	   was	   nonetheless	   unable	   to	   avoid	   the	  fisherman’s	  net	  or	  its	  gruesome	  fate	  once	  caught.24	  This	  is	  supposed	  to	  show	  that	  “知有所
困”	  –	  knowledge	  has	  its	  perils.	  	  We	  are	  then	  told	  to	  “discard	  the	  lesser	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  grammatical	  ambiguity.	  Additionally,	  the	  Chinese	  text	  does	  not	  distinguish	  between	  the	  comparative	  “smaller”	  and	  the	  absolute	  “small”;	  preference	  for	  the	  comparative	  here	  is	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  interpretation	  outlined	  below.	  21	  “大知閑閑，小知閒閒”.	  3/2/9.	  	  22	  E.g.	  Chen	  1983,	  p.	  41;	  Watson	  1968,	  p.37.	  The	  early	  Guangyun	  dictionary	  gives	  a	  gloss	  of	  “great	  (大	  da)”	  for	  “閑”,	  and	  “near	  (近	  jin)”	  for	  “閒”,	  providing	  some	  support	  for	  this	  interpretation	  (Songben	  Guangyun,	  reprinted	  in	  Sturgeon	  2011). 23	  Again	  here	  we	  see	  how	  the	  pre-­‐Qin	  conception	  of	  knowledge	  is	  intimately	  tied	  to	  action:	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  it	  is	  its	  knowledge	  that	  gives	  it	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  this	  feat.	  24	  74/26/24-­‐29.	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greater	  knowledge	  will	  become	  clear”.25	  Taken	  together	  with	  the	  first	  two	  passages,	  this	  seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   greater	   knowledge	   is	   something	   preferable	   to	   lesser	   knowledge,	  and	  at	   the	   same	   time	   there	   is	   a	   sense	   in	  which	   the	  possession	  of	   lesser	  knowledge	   can	  prevent	  greater	  knowledge	  from	  being	  clear	  to	  us.	  	   Fourthly,	  although	  it	  does	  not	  make	  an	  explicit	  contrast	  with	  lesser	  knowledge,	  the	  
Qiu	  Shui	  chapter	   links	   greater	   knowledge	   to	   observation	   of	   and	   appeal	   to	   a	   number	   of	  contrasts:	  far	  and	  near,	  large	  and	  small,	  many	  and	  few,	  past	  and	  present.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  a	  dialogue	  between	  He	  Bo	  and	  Bei	  Hai	  Ruo	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  ways	  our	  thinking	  is	  limited	  by	  our	  experience	  –	  the	  frog	  in	  a	  well	  does	  not	  understand	  the	  sea,	  nor	  the	  summer	  insect	  ice	  –	   the	   focus	  quickly	   turns	   to	  questions	  of	  relativism	  and	  absolutes.	  When	  He	  Bo	  asks	  whether	  one	  might	  take	  heaven	  and	  earth	  as	  being	  exemplary	  of	  “great”,	  and	  the	  point	  of	  a	  hair	   as	   exemplary	   of	   “small”,	   he	   is	   answered	   in	   the	   negative,	   and	   then	   given	   an	  explanation	   in	   terms	   of	   how	   greater	   knowledge	   involves	   looking	   at	   many	   different	  perspectives.26	  This	  appears	  to	  explicitly	  link	  greater	  knowledge	  to	  appreciation	  of	  a	  form	  of	   perspectivism 27 	  –	   in	   particular,	   to	   the	   agent’s	   willingness	   to	   explore	   different	  perspectives	   on	   the	   matter	   under	   consideration,	   and	   also	   to	   the	   range	   of	   available	  perspectives,	   including	   those	   which	   might	   at	   first	   appear	   contradictory	   or	   counter-­‐intuitive.	  The	  passage	  also	  points	  out	  that	  what	  a	  person	  knows	  is	  surely	  outweighed	  by	  what	  he	  does	  not	  know,	  and	  the	  time	  he	  is	  alive	  is	  outweighed	  by	  the	  time	  he	  is	  not.	  Again	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  emphasizing	  the	  importance	  not	  only	  of	  different	  perspectives,	  but	  of	  the	  vast	  number	  of	   them	  which	  exist	   in	  principle.	  Thinking	  back	   to	   the	  Xiaoyaoyou	  passage,	  presumably	  even	  for	  the	  Da-­‐chun	  with	  its	  spring	  and	  autumn	  of	  8000	  years,	  it	  would	  still	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  74/26/30.	  26	  42/17/14-­‐20.	  27	  Perspectivism	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  accepting	  that	  the	  way	  things	  are	  may	  be	  contingent	  upon	  one’s	  perspective.	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be	  true	  that	  the	  time	  before	  it	  was	  born	  was	  greater	  than	  the	  time	  it	  was	  alive.	  So	  while	  it	  is	  important	  to	  examine	  things	  from	  different	  perspectives,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  anyone,	  however	  long-­‐lived,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  examine	  things	  from	  all	  perspectives.	  To	   summarize	   the	   direct	   textual	   evidence,	   the	   Zhuangzi	   seems	   to	   be	   promoting	  greater	  knowledge	  as	  something	  preferable	  to	  lesser	  knowledge,	  while	  also	  claiming	  that	  lesser	  knowledge	   should	  be	   somehow	  rejected	   in	  order	   to	   attain	  greater	  knowledge.	   In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  Zhuangist	  position	  is	  that	  greater	  knowledge	  is	   broader	   than	   lesser	   knowledge,	   because	   it	   encompasses	   a	   range	   of	   different	  perspectives,	  and	  this	  is	  also	  one	  way	  that	  we	  can	  come	  to	  obtain	  greater	  knowledge	  –	  by	  considering	   the	  possible	  alternative	  perspectives.	  Considering	  how	   things	  might	  appear	  or	  actually	  be	  from	  the	  points	  of	  view	  of	  others,	  and	  thinking	  about	  things	  while	  paying	  particular	   attention	   to	   various	   alternative	   aspects	   or	  dimensions	  of	   the	  matter	   at	   hand,	  can	  lead	  to	  increased	  insight,	  and	  improved,	  “better”	  knowledge.	  	  
Interpreting	  “greater	  knowledge”	  	   “Greater	   knowledge”	   for	   the	   Zhuangzi	   cannot	  mean	   ultimate	   knowledge	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  knowledge	  of	  what	  is	  ultimately	  so	  or	  not-­‐so	  (果是	  or	  果非),	  because	  this	  would	  contradict	  the	  Zhuangist	  skeptical	  position.	  But	  it	  nonetheless	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  that	  is	  endorsed	  by	  the	  Zhuangzi	  as	  being	  superior	  to,	  or	  preferable	  to,	  the	  lesser	  knowledge	  with	  which	  it	  is	  contrasted.	  Additionally,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  suggestion	  in	  the	  text	  that	  it	  is	   something	   that	   is	   only	   available	   to	   a	   sage	   or	   spirit,	   and	   in	   fact	   we	   are	   told	   that	   we	  ourselves	  can	  attain	  it	  if	  we	  only	  abandon	  our	  lesser	  knowledge. On	  my	   interpretation,	   this	   is	  a	   theme	  that	   is	  echoed	  repeatedly	   in	   the	  Zhuangzi’s	  stories.	  Greater	  knowledge	   is	   the	  kind	  of	   knowledge	   that	  holds	   from	  a	  greater	   range	  of	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perspectives;	   lesser	   knowledge	   is	   the	   kind	   that	   holds	   from	   a	   narrower	   range,	   perhaps	  even	  just	  the	  narrow-­‐minded	  perspective	  we	  happen	  to	  take	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  For	  example,	  suppose	  a	  hedgehog	  has	  knowledge	  that	  “seeing	  a	  big	  juicy	  slug	  makes	  one	  feel	  hungry”.	  Such	   knowledge	   would	   generally	   be	   a	   case	   of	   lesser	   knowledge,	   due	   to	   its	   clear	  contingency	   upon	   perspective:	   there	   are	   other	   creatures	   from	   whose	   perspective	   the	  sight	   of	   a	   big	   juicy	   slug	   does	   not	   invoke	   hunger.28	  On	   this	   account,	   there	   is	   a	   sense	   in	  which	   greater	   knowledge	   can	   be	   generalized	   lesser	   knowledge,	   because	   if	   something	  holds	  from	  all	  the	  perspectives	  I	  am	  able	  to	  consider,	  then	  it	  certainly	  holds	  from	  any	  one	  narrow	   perspective	   I	   happen	   to	   be	   taking	   right	   now.	   For	   example,	   the	   knowledge	   that	  “seeing	  tasty-­‐looking	  things	  makes	  one	  feel	  hungry”	  might	  be	  a	  greater	  form	  of	  knowledge	  than	  the	  previous	  example,	  as	  it	  would	  hold	  from	  more	  perspectives	  than	  simply	  that	  of	  the	  hedgehog.	  Greater	  knowledge	  can	  also	  be	  simply	   lesser	  knowledge	  together	  with	  an	  awareness	   of	   those	   perspectives	   from	   which	   the	   thing	   does	   actually	   hold,	   or	   the	  limitations	  of	  the	  knowledge	  involved	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  lesser	  knowledge	  “relativized”	  to	  the	   particular	   perspectives	   from	  which	   it	   does	   hold.	   So,	   “seeing	   a	   big	   juicy	   slug	  makes	  
hedgehogs	   feel	  hungry”	  would	  again	  be	  of	   a	   greater	   species	  of	  knowledge	   than	   the	   first	  example,	  because	  it	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  contingency	  upon	  the	  perspective	  involved.	  On	  this	   account,	   when	   the	   Zhuangzi	   criticizes	   someone	   for	   not	   seeing	   an	   important	  alternative	  perspective	  upon	  his	   situation,	   this	   is	   to	  say	   that	   the	  person	  being	  criticized	  has	  committed	   in	  some	  sense	  a	  cognitive	  error.	  He	  or	  she	  has	   taken	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  however	  that	  “greater”	  and	  “lesser”	  are	  relative	  terms,	  and	  that	  what	  in	  one	  context	  is	  “lesser”	  may	  in	  another	  context	  be	  “greater”.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  suppose	  that	  hunger	  is	  only	  reliably	  invoked	  in	  hedgehogs	  by	  slugs	  when	  the	  slugs	  involved	  are	  big	  and	  juicy,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  the	  case	  that	  “seeing	  a	  slug	  makes	  one	  feel	  hungry”	  was	  lesser	  knowledge	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  greater	  knowledge	  that	  “seeing	  a	  big	  
juicy	  slug	  makes	  one	  feel	  hungry”	  –	  the	  former	  perhaps	  being	  contingent	  upon	  one’s	  perspective	  in	  various	  ways,	  for	  instance	  because	  smaller	  and	  less	  juicy	  slugs	  also	  invoke	  hunger	  in	  smaller	  hedgehogs,	  whereas	  in	  larger	  hedgehogs	  they	  do	  not.	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and	  mistakenly	  believed	   it	   (perhaps	   implicitly)	   to	  be	  “greater	  knowledge”	  –	   to	  hold	   in	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  situations	  or	  from	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  perspectives	  than	  it	  actually	  does;	  the	  
Zhuangzi	  points	  out	  a	  perspective	  from	  which	  it	  does	  not	  hold,	  revealing	  their	  mistake.	  The	  focus	  of	  such	  Zhuangist	  criticism	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  that,	  in	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	   Zhuangist,	   the	   agent	   is	   simply	  wrong	   and	   so	   should	   be	   opposed	   or	   condemned	   by	  others,	   but	   that	   the	   person	   by	   his	   or	   her	   own	   standards	   has	   failed	   to	   see	   something	  importantly	  relevant	  to	  his	  own	  thinking	  or	  action,	  and	  once	  shown	  it	  will	  himself	  accept	  its	   importance.29 	  In	   many	   of	   the	   stories	   in	   the	   Zhuangzi	   which	   relate	   to	   differing	  perspectives,	   the	  conclusion	  of	   the	  story	   is	  not	  merely	   that	   the	  actor	  did	  not	   see	  all	   the	  relevant	   perspectives	   and	   so	   was	   wrong	   or	   narrow-­‐minded	   from	   someone	   else’s	  perspective,	  but	  rather	  that	  because	  he	  failed	  to	  consider	  all	  the	  relevant	  perspectives,	  he	  did	  something	  which	  he	  ought	  himself	  to	  accept	  as	  being	  stupid	  or	  wrong	  once	  these	  other	  perspectives	   are	   pointed	   out	   to	   him.	   So	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   sense	   in	  which	   being	   aware	   of	  different	  perspectives	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  of	  advantage	  to	  ourselves,	  and	  not	  just	  to	  others	  who	  may	  have	  different	  perspectives	  to	  our	  own.	  If	  we	  had	  seen	  these	  other	  perspectives,	  we	  would	  have	  been	  better	  off	  –	  we	  might	  not	  have	  done	  something	  that	  we	  would	  later	  come	  to	  see	  as	  foolish.	  Consider	  the	  story	  of	  Huizi	  and	  the	  giant	  gourds.30	  Huizi	   is	  given	  seeds	  that	  grow	  into	   giant	   gourds	   so	   large	   that	   they	   cannot	   be	   used	   as	   containers	   or	   drinking	   vessels,	  conventional	  uses	   for	  gourds.	  Huizi	   therefore	  decides	   to	  discard	  them,	  “because	  of	   their	  uselessness”.	  Zhuangzi	   criticizes	   this	  as	  Huizi	  being	   “stupid	   in	  his	  use	  of	   the	   large”,	   and	  goes	  on	  to	  tell	  a	  story	  about	  a	  man	  of	  Song	  who	  made	  a	  salve	  that	  prevented	  hands	  from	  becoming	  chapped;	  his	  family	  used	  it	  for	  generations	  in	  the	  course	  of	  bleaching	  silk,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  As	  David	  Wong	  puts	  it,	  questioning	  our	  existing	  knowledge	  commitments	  “moves	  us	  to	  look	  for	  what	  we	  might	  have	  missed”	  (Wong	  2005,	  p.104).	  30	  2/1/35-­‐42.	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earned	  them	  a	  meager	  wage.	  The	  salve	  is	  sold	  to	  a	  stranger,	  who	  then	  becomes	  a	  general	  of	  the	  King	  of	  Wu,	  and	  uses	  the	  salve	  in	  a	  winter	  naval	  war	  with	  the	  state	  of	  Yue,	  leading	  to	  a	  great	  victory,	  and	  the	  stranger	  being	  generously	  rewarded.	  The	  function	  of	  the	  salve	  was	  the	  same	  in	  both	  cases,	  but	  the	  outcomes	  were	  very	  different	  because	  of	  how	  it	  was	  used.	  The	  text	  seems	  to	  be	  criticizing	  Huizi	   for	  close-­‐mindedness:	   for	  being	  so	  attached	  to	  the	  conventional	  perspective	  on	  the	  use	  of	  gourds	  that	  he	  overlooked	  other	  possible	  uses	  for	  them.	  Zhuangzi	  suggests	  they	  might	  have	  been	  useful	  in	  making	  rafts	  on	  which	  one	  might	  float	  on	  rivers	  and	  lakes;	  the	  point	  is	  that,	  even	  so	  long	  as	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  utility	  of	  gourds,	  as	  Huizi	  himself	  was,	  we	  need	  to	  remain	  open	  to	  the	  enormous	  variety	  of	  ways	  in	   which	   gourds	   might	   potentially	   be	   useful.	   Our	   commitment	   to	   the	   conventional	  perspective	  that	  gourds	  are	  useful	  as	  containers	  or	  drinking	  vessels	  may	  blind	  us	  to	  other	  perspectives	   on	   their	   utility.	   That	   “gourds	   are	   useful	   as	   containers	   or	   drinking	   vessels”	  seems	  to	  hold	  for	  ordinary	  gourds,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  hold	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  “the	  large”,	  since	   in	   the	   case	   of	   large	   gourds,	   gourds	   are	   not	   in	   fact	   useful	   for	   these	   purposes.	  Attachment	  to	  our	  familiar	  perspective	  on	  gourds	  –	  their	  typical	  use	  as	  drinking	  vessels	  –	  should	   not	   blind	   us	   to	   other	   possible	   uses	   for	   them.	  Huizi	   took	   the	   utility	   of	   gourds	   as	  being	  their	  usefulness	  as	  containers	  or	  drinking	  vessels,	  and	  so	  concluded	  that	  the	  gourds	  in	  question	  being	  too	  large	  for	  this	  purpose	  had	  no	  utility;	  Zhuangzi	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  perspective	  which	  Huizi	  had	  not	  considered	  –	  utility	  not	  as	  a	  container	  but	  as	  a	  raft	  –	  from	  which	  this	  is	  not	  so.	  Were	  Huizi	  claiming	  knowledge	  about	  gourds	  that	  did	  not	  fail	  to	  hold	   from	   some	   perspective	   (perhaps	   something	   like	   “gourds	   grow	   from	   seeds”),	   he	  would	  be	  immune	  to	  this	  type	  of	  Zhuangist	  criticism.	  Similarly,	  if	  he	  were	  to	  see	  the	  limits	  of	   the	   claims	   like	   “gourds	  are	  useful	   as	   containers”	  –	  namely,	   that	   this	   is	   a	   claim	  which	  may	  be	  true	  in	  many	  circumstances,	  but	  not	  in	  all	  cases	  –	  he	  would	  also	  avoid	  making	  the	  mistake	  of	  assuming	  that	  all	  gourds	  are	  useful	  as	  containers,	  and	  only	  containers.	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Secondly,	   consider	   the	   example	   of	   the	   useless	   tree.	  31	  Huizi	   compares	   Zhuangzi’s	  words	  to	  a	  great	  tree	  that	  is	   large	  but	  has	  knotted	  branches	  and	  is	  unsuitable	  for	  use	  as	  timber;	  he	  declares	  that	  Zhuangzi’s	  words,	  like	  the	  tree,	  are	  useless.	  Zhuangzi’s	  response	  does	   not	   try	   to	   directly	   refute	  Huizi’s	   claims,	   but	   instead	   talks	   about	  wild	   animals	   that	  exist	  without	  worrying	  about	  the	  limitations	  of	  what	  they	  can	  and	  cannot	  do,	  though	  they	  are	  skilled	  in	  different	  ways.	  Zhuangzi	  suggests	  that	  Huizi	  worry	  less	  about	  the	  tree’s	  so-­‐called	   “uselessness”,	   and	   instead	   find	   a	   suitable	   place	   for	   it	   and	   relax	   in	   its	   shade,	   for	  (being	  useless	  as	  timber),	  it	  will	  surely	  not	  be	  cut	  down.	  In	   this	   example,	   too,	   Huizi	   failed	   to	   see	   all	   the	   possible	   perspectives	   available.	  Again	   the	   text	   seems	   to	   be	   emphasizing	   that	   “utility”	   is	   not	   an	   absolute;	   it	   only	  makes	  sense	   to	   talk	  about	  utility	   from	  some	  particular	  perspective,	   in	  both	  senses	  of	   the	  word	  distinguished	  above.	  A	  thing	  can	  be	  useful	   to	  me,	  or	  useful	   to	  you;	  or	  can	  be	  useful	  as	  a	  source	  of	  timber	  or	  as	  a	  catcher	  of	  mice;	  but	  nothing	  is	  “useful”	  or	  “useless”	  in	  an	  absolute,	  perspective-­‐independent	  sense.	  The	  perceived	  uselessness	  of	  the	  tree	  (from	  Huizi’s	  or	  the	  carpenter’s	  perspective)	  is	  actually	  useful	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  tree,	  for	  it	  prevents	  it	  being	  cut	  down.	  Equally,	  even	  if	  we	  remain	  committed	  to	  the	  perspective	  of	  utility	  to	  us,	  rather	   than	   bemoaning	   the	   uselessness	   of	   the	   tree,	   we	   could	   consider	   an	   alternative	  perspective	  on	  its	  utility	  to	  us	  –	  despite	  its	  knotted	  branches,	  it	  would	  still	  be	  useful	  as	  a	  source	  of	  shade	  beneath	  which	  to	  rest.	  Again	  new	  perspectives,	  both	  that	  of	  the	  tree	  itself,	  and	  that	  of	  an	  alternative	  mode	  of	  utility,	  are	  used	  to	  show	  how	  Huizi’s	  “knowledge”	  that	  the	  tree	  is	  useless	  is	  contingent	  upon	  perspective,	  and	  so	  in	  an	  important	  sense	  flawed.	  Thirdly,	   consider	   the	   examples	   given	  by	  Wang	  Ni	  when	   asked	  whether	   he	   knew	  what	   it	   is	   that	   all	   things	   agree	   upon.32	  These	   examples	   are	   particularly	   relevant	   to	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  3/1/42-­‐47.	  32	  6/2/64-­‐73.	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question	  of	  lesser	  knowledge,	  greater	  knowledge,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two.	  Firstly,	  Wang	  Ni	  replies	  to	  the	  question	  with	  his	  own	  question:	  “How	  could	  I	  know	  that,”	  suggesting	  that	  it	  would	  be	  beyond	  his	  ability	  to	  know	  such	  a	  thing,	  not	  (as	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  examples	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  give)	  because	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  know	  what	  some	  things	  take	  as	  so	  or	  not-­‐so,	  but	  rather	  because	  he	  is	  unable	  to	  be	  sure	  that	  there	  is	  any	  particular	  thing	  which	  all	  things	  take	  as	  so	  or	  not-­‐so.	  He	  gives	  three	  concrete	  examples:	  the	  right	  place	  to	  sleep,	  the	  right	  taste,	  and	  the	  right	  idea	  of	  beauty.	  In	  each	  case,	  he	  gives	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  answer	  depends	  upon	  one’s	  perspective	  –	  humans	  and	  other	  animals	  disagree	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases,	  so	  there	  is	  no	  one	  universally	  “right”	  answer.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  passage,	  Nie	  Que	  further	  asks	  whether,	  given	  that	  Wang	  Ni	  does	  not	  know	  such	  things,	  might	  not	  the	  “perfect	  man	  (至人	  zhi	  ren)”	  know?	  This	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  might	  be	  very	  tempting	  to	  say	  that	  claims	  which	  hold	  true	  from	  all	  perspectives	  constitute	  some	  sort	  of	  “universal	  truth”	  –	  and	  if	  so,	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  these	  truths,	   though	   perhaps	   not	   knowable	   by	   ordinary	  men,	   could	   be	   known	   by	   a	   sage.	   But	  Wang	  Ni	  does	  not	  answer	  in	  the	  affirmative,	  and	  instead	  emphasizes	  the	  great	  differences	  between	  a	   sage	  and	  an	  ordinary	  man.	  A	   sage,	  he	   says,	   is	   like	   a	   spirit,	   and	   can	   “ride	   the	  clouds	   and	   the	   qi”,	   and	   “wander	   beyond	   the	   four	   seas”.33	  So	   different	   a	   being	   from	  ourselves	  would	  very	   likely	  have	  a	  very	  different	  perspective	   from	  our	  own.	  This	  raises	  another	   issue,	  which	  seems	  to	  suggest	   that	  Wang	  Ni	  might	  actually	  be	  answering	   in	   the	  negative:	   with	   a	   sufficiently	   powerful	   imagination,	   we	   can	   surely	   come	   up	   with	   some	  circumstance	   or	   perspective	   from	   which	   any	   individual	   statement	   will	   not	   hold.	   The	  possibility	  of	  the	  sage,	  with	  his	  vastly	  different	  perspective	  on	  the	  world	  to	  ours,	  seems	  to	  be	  one	  possible	  instance	  of	  this.	  As	  long	  as	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  sage	  such	  as	  Wang	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  A	  broadly	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Da	  Zong	  Shi	  chapter,	  where	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  “There	  must	  first	  be	  a	  True	  Man	  (真人)	  before	  there	  can	  be	  True	  knowledge	  (
真知).”	  Only	  the	  true	  man,	  like	  the	  sage,	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  “True	  knowledge”	  (15/6/4).	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Ni	  describes	  existing,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  way	  we	  could	  say	  for	  certain	  what	  it	  is	  that	  all	  things	  take	  as	  so	  or	  not-­‐so,	  because	  we	  simply	  have	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  what	  a	  sage	  would	  take	   as	   so	   or	   not-­‐so	   from	   his	   perspective.	   There	   is	   always	   the	   chance	   that,	   despite	  everyone	  we	  know	  taking	  something	  as	  so	  or	  not-­‐so,	   they	  are	  nonetheless	  wrong,	  and	  a	  sage	  would	  in	  fact	  disagree	  with	  them.	  These	  examples	  together	  suggest	  two	  key	  points.	  Firstly,	  in	  ordinary	  cases	  we	  can	  improve	  our	  epistemic	  situation	  by	  considering	  other	  perspectives	  on	   the	  matter	  under	  consideration.	  A	   commitment	   to	   a	   knowledge	   claim	   that	  holds	   from	  a	  broader	   range	  of	  perspectives	   will	   put	   us	   in	   a	   better	   epistemic	   position	   than	   a	   commitment	   to	   a	   claim	  holding	  from	  a	  narrower	  range	  or	  perspectives.	  We	  will	  face	  less	  risk	  of	  accusations	  of	  our	  not	  knowing	  the	  thing	  in	  question	  if	  others,	  both	  from	  their	  own	  perspectives	  and	  other	  perspectives	   that	   they	  might	   consider,	  will	   accept	   that	   our	   claim	   also	   holds	   from	   these	  perspectives.	   Similarly,	   we	   will	   also	   be	   in	   an	   epistemically	   superior	   position	   if	   we	  recognize,	  at	  least	  implicitly,	  the	  limited	  range	  of	  perspectives	  from	  which	  what	  we	  claim	  to	  know	  holds.	  By	  qualifying	  our	  knowledge	  claims,	  we	  again	  avoid	  accusations	  of	  failure	  to	   know,	   by	   excluding	   perspectives	   from	   which	   we	   have	   already	   recognized	   our	  knowledge	   claim	   does	   not	   hold.	   Secondly,	   even	   if	   we	   do	   this,	   no	   matter	   how	   many	  perspectives	  we	  consider,	   there	   is	   still	   the	  chance	   that	   through	   failing	   to	  consider	  all	  of	  the	  perspectives,	  we	  will	   fail	   to	  know	   in	  an	  absolute	  sense	  –	  and	   this	  may	  simply	  be	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  human	  condition	  which	  we	  should	  learn	  to	  live	  with.	  Thus	  when	  we	  look	  at	  any	  one	  of	  our	  claims	  to	  knowledge,	  we	  can	  think	  about	  how	  it	   changes	   under	   substitution	   of	   perspective.	   If	   it	   holds	   up	   from	   many	   different	  perspectives,	   we	   have	   good	   reason	   to	   think	   of	   it	   as	   being	   “greater	   knowledge”;	   if	   it	   is	  highly	   contingent	  on	  our	   current	  perspective,	   it	   is	   surely	   “lesser	  knowledge”,	  unless	  we	  can	   cultivate	   an	   awareness	   of	   how	   it	   is	   importantly	   dependent	   upon	   certain	   relevant	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perspectives.	   There	   is	   a	   clear	   sense	   in	   which	   possessing	   “greater	   knowledge”	   is	  epistemically	   better	   than	   possessing	   “lesser	   knowledge”,	   namely	   that	   it	   holds	   true	   in	   a	  greater	   range	   of	   situations.	   But	   we	   should	   not	   expect	   to	   be	   able	   to	   find	   “ultimate	  knowledge”	  which	  holds	  in	  all	  perspectives,	  if	  only	  for	  one	  simple	  reason:	  there’s	  no	  way	  we	  could	  even	  grasp	  all	  the	  available	  perspectives	  to	  begin	  with.	  In	  rather	  the	  same	  way	  that	  science	  aims	  to	  find	  a	  simple	  and	  coherent	  explanation	  for	   myriad	   phenomena	   –	   a	   theory	   of	   mechanics,	   or	   even	   a	   theory	   of	   everything	   –	   the	  Zhuangist	   position	   suggests	   that	   we	   should	   concentrate	   less	   on	   the	   specifics	   –	   gourds	  make	   good	   water	   vessels,	   a	   house	   is	   the	   right	   place	   to	   live	   –	   and	  more	   on	   the	   bigger	  picture	  revealed	  by	  noticing	  what	  is	  common	  to	  many	  specific	  cases	  –	  big,	  light,	  and	  hard	  things	   can	   float	   on	   water,	   and	   creatures	   live	   in	   environments	   conducive	   to	   their	  wellbeing.	   Generalized	   knowledge	   is	   much	   more	   useful	   than	   specific	   knowledge,	   and	  specific	   knowledge	   can	   easily	   confuse	   us	   into	  making	   the	  wrong	   judgment	   or	   decision	  when	   we	   forget	   that	   it	   only	   holds	   from	   a	   narrow	   range	   of	   perspectives.	   Specific	  knowledge	  only	  really	  applies	  in	  a	  very	  small	  range	  of	  cases	  –	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  try	  to	  apply	  it	  outside	   the	   appropriate	   range,	   we	   commit	   a	   cognitive	   error	   and	   may	   reach	   invalid	  conclusions.	  We	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	   these	   limits,	  and	  of	  other	  perspectives	   from	  which	  our	  specific	  “knowledge”	  would	  not	  be	  so,	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  making	  these	  errors.	  	  
Knowing	  more	  of	  what	  there	  is	  to	  know	  	  One	  aspect	  of	  lesser	  knowledge	  when	  contrasted	  with	  greater	  knowledge	  is	  that	  it	  is	  “incomplete”:	  it	  misses,	  in	  some	  important	  way,	  salient	  aspects	  of	  whatever	  it	  is	  that	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  known.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  lesser	  knowledge	  is	  wrong	  in	  and	  of	  itself,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  somehow	  fails	  to	  capture	  a	  sufficiently	  large	  part	  of	  whatever	  is	  in	  question.	  What	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actually	  is	  wrong	  is	  taking	  this	  partial,	  narrow	  view	  as	  being	  representative	  of	  a	  broader	  whole	  than	  it	  actually	  is.	  This	   idea	   is	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  Xunzi’s	  warnings	  of	  how	  people	  get	   themselves	  into	  trouble	  by	  being	  blinded,	  “blinkered,”	  or	  fixated	  by	  one	  corner	  of	  things	  and	  so	  fail	  to	  see	   the	   “greater	   pattern”.	   The	  Xunzi’s	   descriptions	   of	   how	   those	   of	   “partial	   knowledge”	  look	  upon	  only	  one	  corner	  of	  the	  Dao	  (曲知之人觀於道之一隅)34	  seem	  clearly	  related	  to	  how	  the	  Qiu	  Shui	  talks	  of	  “greater	  knowledge”,	  which	  looks	  upon	  things	  from	  far	  and	  near	  (大知觀於遠近).35	  The	  Xunzi	  clearly	  frames	  a	  very	  similar	  problem	  –	  that	  our	  knowledge	  can	  be	  twisted	  by	  seeing	   just	  one	  corner	  of	   the	  Dao	  –	  to	  which	  Zhuangist	   ideas	  propose	  the	  solution	  of	  examining	  the	  issue	  from	  multiple	  perspectives.	  Interestingly,	  the	  Xunzi	  also	  gives	  a	  list	  of	  concrete	  examples	  of	  what	  things	  cause	  blinding:	  desires	  and	  dislikes,	  beginning	  and	  end,	  far	  and	  near,	  deep	  and	  shallow,	  past	  and	  present.36	  When	   combined	   with	   the	   further	   examples	   it	   goes	   on	   to	   give,	   it	   seems	   that	  many	   of	   the	   causes	   of	   blinkering	   can	   be	   broadly	   termed	   “perspectives”	   –	   either	   our	  perspective	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  our	   internal	  psychological	   state	   (desire	  or	  dislike),	  or	   in	   the	  sense	   of	   our	   location	   and	   situation	   in	   the	  world	   (looking	   at	   something	   from	   far	   away).	  From	  these	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Xunzi,	  just	  like	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  sees	  perspective	  as	  something	  that	  can	  cause	  us	  to	  reason	  badly	  by	  way	  of	  failing	  to	  appreciate	  the	  bigger	  picture.	  Again	  this	  reinforces	  the	  Zhuangist	  stance	  that	  there	  is	  no	  skeptical	  question	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  external	  world	  waiting	  to	  be	  solved	  here;	  the	  question	  is	  merely	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  are	  correctly	   grasping	   it,	   as	   we	   may	   have	   been	   blinkered	   by	   our	   perspective.	   The	   Xunzi’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Xunzi:	  21/103/12.	  35	  42/17/15-­‐16.	  36	  Xunzi:	  21/102/12-­‐13. 
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proposed	  solution	  to	  the	  blinkering	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  eliminate	  the	  biased	  perspectives,	  and	  approach	  the	  matter	  at	  hand	  with	  an	  empty,	  focused,	  and	  calm	  mind.37 Although	   the	   Xunzi’s	   treatment	   in	   some	   ways	   closely	   parallels	   the	   Zhuangist	  stance,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Xunzi	   is	   in	   a	   way	  much	  more	   unilateral	   in	   its	  condemnation	  of	  “blinkering”.	  “Blinkering”	  is	  presented	  as	  something	  that	  is	  simply	  bad;	  in	  the	  Xunzi’s	  presentation,	  the	  perspectives	  involved	  offer	  no	  direct	  positive	  contribution	  to	  our	  attaining	  knowledge,	  but	  are	  merely	  obstacles	  to	  attaining	  knowledge	  that	  must	  be	  done	   away	   with. The	   Zhuangzi,	   by	   contrast,	   often	   seems	   to	   delight	   in	   pointing	   out	  unexpected	  or	  unanticipated	  perspectives	  on	  the	  matter	  at	  hand.	  Unlike	  the	  Xunzi,	  for	  the	  
Zhuangzi	   individual	  perspectives,	   though	   limiting	   if	   taken	  as	  being	  representative	  of	   the	  whole,	   are	   also	   crucially	   valuable	   in	   themselves,	   because	   each	   inherently	   biased	  perspective	   itself	   makes	   up	   a	   small	   part	   of	   the	   whole.38	  For	   the	   Zhuangzi,	   it	   would	   be	  foolish	   for	   us	   to	   only	   appreciate	   the	   world	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	   cicada,	   just	   as	   it	  would	  be	  foolish	  to	  appreciate	  it	  only	  from	  that	  of	  a	  giant	  Peng	  bird;	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  both	   of	   these	   perspectives	   are	   valuable	   because	   they	   can	   help	   give	   us	   insight	   into	   a	  “greater	  knowledge”	  of	  what	  the	  world	  might	  be	  like	  from	  the	  full	  range	  of	  perspectives	  available	   to	   us	   –	   not	  merely	  what	   the	  world	   is	   like	   contingent	   upon	   our	   own	   size.	   The	  
Zhuangzi,	  unlike	  the	  Xunzi,	  emphasizes	  that	  it	  is	  just	  as	  foolish	  for	  us	  to	  not	  appreciate	  the	  world	  from	  some	  perspective	  as	  it	  is	  to	  only	  appreciate	  it	  from	  that	  perspective. 	  
Knowledge	  and	  the	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  37	  Xunzi:	  21/103/25-­‐21/104/10.	  38	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Xunzi	  sees	  biased	  perspectives	  as	  being	  blinkered	  and	  so	  seeing	  or	  
capturing	  only	  part	  of	  the	  whole,	  whereas	  the	  Zhuangzi	  sees	  them	  as	  simply	  being	  part	  of	  the	  whole.	  Therefore	  all	  perspectives	  are	  important	  to	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  whereas	  for	  the	  
Xunzi	  there	  can	  be	  one	  unbiased	  perspective	  which	  is	  more	  important	  than	  all	  others.	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The	  tentative	   interpretation	  outlined	  so	   far	  will	  be	  plausible	  only	   if	   it	  can	  cohere	  with	  other	  key	  claims	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  makes	  about	  knowledge.	  In	  particular,	  there	  must	  be	  some	  explanation	   for	  how	  the	  seeming	  endorsement	  of	   “greater	  knowledge”	  squares	  with	  the	  seemingly	  negative	  stance	  much	  of	  the	  text	  takes	  towards	  knowledge	  in	  general.	  “Daoists”	   are	   often	   associated	  with	   the	   slogan	   of	   “abandoning	   knowledge”,39	  and	  indeed	   this	   slogan	   appears	   several	   times	   in	   the	   Zhuangzi	   (though	   only	   in	   the	   outer	  chapters),	   the	   implication	   being	   that	   to	   follow	   the	   Dao,	   knowledge	   is	   not	   only	   not	  required,	   but	   can	   actually	   have	   a	   detrimental	   effect.	   Even	   in	   the	   inner	   chapters,	  knowledge	   is	   at	   one	   point	   described	   as	   “an	   instrument	   of	   conflict”	   and	   a	   “deadly	  weapon”.40	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Qiwulun	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  endorsing	  the	  men	  of	  old	  when	  it	  says	   of	   them	   that	   “their	   knowledge	   reached	   an	   extreme	   point”,	   which	   is	   described	   as	  “holding	   that	   nothing	   had	   ever	   existed”;	   closely	   followed	   by	   the	   alternative	   views	   that	  “things	   existed,	   but	   there	   were	   no	   boundaries	   between	   things”,	   and	   that	   “there	   were	  boundaries	   between	   things	   but	   not	   yet	   shi	   and	   fei”.41	  It	   would	   seem	   that	   for	   someone	  holding	   such	   views,	   on	   the	   pre-­‐Qin	   conception	   of	   knowledge,	   there	  might	   be	   relatively	  little	  that	  one	  could	  claim	  to	  know	  –	  certainly	  knowledge	  of	  everyday	  external	  objects,	  for	  example,	  would	  seem	  out	  of	   reach	   for	  someone	  committed	   to	   the	  non-­‐existence	  of	  such	  objects.	  The	   inner	  chapters	  also	  point	  out	  that	  while	  our	   life	   is	   limited,	  knowledge	   itself	  has	  no	  corresponding	  limit	  –	  and	  pursuing	  the	  limitless	  with	  the	  limited	  will	  surely	  lead	  to	  trouble.42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  棄知	  	  or 棄智;	  the	  slogan	  is	  most	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  Daodejing,	  which	  claims	  that	  “discarding	  sages/sageliness	  and	  abandoning	  knowledge	  would	  bring	  a	  hundredfold	  benefit	  to	  the	  ordinary	  people”. 40	  8/4/6-­‐7.	  41	  5/2/40-­‐41. 42	  7/3/1.	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However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  passages	  suggest	  that	  knowledge	  is	  necessarily	  a	  bad	  thing	  to	  possess	  in	  all	  cases	  –	  they	  merely	  make	  the	  point	  that	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  attain,	  and	  it	  may	  distort	  our	  way	  of	  living	  if	  we	  value	  it	  above	  all	  else.	  In	  the	  story	   of	   Cook	   Ding	   which	   immediately	   follows	   the	   discussion	   about	   pursuing	   limitless	  knowledge	  with	   a	   limited	   life,	   Cook	   Ding,	   whose	   skill	   in	   butchering	   oxen	   the	   Zhuangzi	  explicitly	  associates	  with	  Dao,	  pointedly	  notes	   in	  his	  explanation	   that	  during	  his	   skillful	  execution	  of	  the	  task,	  his	  perceptual	  knowledge	  (官知	  guan	  zhi)	  ends.	  It	  seems	  clear	  from	  the	  context	  that	  while	  engaged	  in	  the	  task,	  Ding	  might	  not	  know	  such	  things	  as	  where	  he	  next	  ought	  to	  move	  the	  knife,	  or	  which	  joint	  it	  is	  that	  he	  is	  cutting	  through,	  but	  one	  thing	  the	  story	  demonstrates	  that	  he	  very	  clearly	  does	  know	  is	  how	  to	  butcher	  oxen.	  Similarly,	  even	   in	   those	  passages	   focusing	  on	  skeptical	  doubt,	  many	  assumptions	  are	  made	  as	  to	  the	  knowability	  of	  things.	  If	  the	  reader	  were	  expected	  to	  be	  skeptical	  that	  “monkeys	  live	  in	  trees”,	  or	  skeptical	  about	  what	  “monkeys”	  are,	  or	  of	  how	  we	  might	  come	  to	  know	  such	  things,	  then	  the	  argument	  for	  doubting	  there	  being	  one	  “right	  place”	  would	  seem	  largely	  nonsensical. So	  the	  focus	  of	  these	  less	  radical-­‐sounding	  parts	  of	  the	  text	  seems	  not	  to	  be	  that	  we	  should	  abandon	  all	  knowledge,	  but	  rather	  that	  we	  should	  not	  pursue	  knowledge	  itself	  as	  if	  it	  were	  some	  kind	  of	  panacea	  or	  universal	  solution	  to	  all	  our	  problems.43	  Knowledge	  is	  not	  of	  value	  in	  itself;	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  some	  knowledge	  may	  be	  useful	  as	  a	  means	  to	  living	  a	  good	  life.	  More	   radical	   passages	   of	   the	   text	   go	   on	   to	   imply	   that	   since	   knowledge	   is	   not	  inherently	   valuable,	   and	   is	   always	   “provisional”	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	  might	   subsequently	  turn	  out	   to	  be	  merely	   “lesser	   knowledge”	  prejudiced	  by	  perspective,	   the	   ideal	   situation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  mistake	  that	  the	  Tian	  Xia	  chapter	  attributes	  to	  Hui	  Shi	  –	  though	  he	  “daily	  used	  his	  knowledge	  to	  debate	  with	  others,”	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  heaven	  and	  earth	  this	  had	  no	  more	  significance	  than	  the	  frantic	  buzzing	  of	  a	  mosquito	  (94/33/80-­‐85).	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would	  be	  one	   in	  which	  we	  abandon	  all	  knowledge.	  This	   is	   the	  position	   taken	   in	  several	  places	   by	   the	   “spirit	  man”	   or	   “true	  man”,	  who	   takes	   such	   a	   radical	   stance	   towards	   the	  world	  that	  he	  gives	  up	  all	  shi-­fei	  distinctions,	  thereby	  seemingly	  also	  giving	  up	  agency	  and	  ceasing	  to	  live	  a	  recognizably	  human	  life	  –	  	  “even	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  ant	  he	  puts	  away;	  his	   plans	   are	   simply	   those	   of	   the	   fishes.	   Even	   the	   notions	   of	   the	   sheep	   he	   discards.”44 Although	   this	   radical	   stance	   does	   not	   seem	   representative	   of	   the	   whole	   text,	   the	  observation	  that	  parts	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  appear	  so	  radically	  critical	  of	  knowledge	  in	  general	  sits	  uneasily	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  “greater	  knowledge”	   is	   in	  any	  way	  preferable	  to	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  –	  the	  “spirit	  man”,	  for	  one,	  would	  presumably	  view	  both	  as	  equally	  worthless. In	  addressing	   this	  puzzle,	   it	   is	  worth	   first	   reiterating	   that	   it	   seems	  clear	   that	   the	  distinction	  between	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  and	  “greater	  knowledge”	  is	  a	  relative	  rather	  than	  an	   absolute	   distinction.	  What	  may	   be	   considered	   “greater	   knowledge”	   in	   one	   situation	  might	   easily	   be	   viewed	   as	   “lesser	   knowledge”	   in	   another.	   Therefore	   the	   claim	   that	  “greater	  knowledge”	  is	  in	  some	  way	  preferable	  to	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  “greater	   knowledge”	   is	   somehow	   absolutely	   correct	   or	   justified	   in	   some	   way	   whereas	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  is	  not.	  With	   this	   in	   mind,	   the	   distinction	   between	   lesser	   and	   greater	   knowledge	   can	  actually	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  link	  between	  more	  moderate	  and	  more	  radical	  Daoist	  positions.	  The	  moderate	  position	  takes	  it	  that	  we	  can	  know	  some	  things,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  having	  the	  ability	   to	  draw	   shi-­fei	  distinctions	   that,	   though	  not	  ultimately	  privileged	  or	   justified,	  are	  useful	   to	  us	   in	   achieving	  our	  provisional,	   contingent	   aims.	  Whatever	  knowledge	  we	  think	   we	   have,	   we	   might	   on	   reflection	   come	   to	   see	   that	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   merely	   “lesser	  knowledge”	  which	  we	  might	  want	  to	  give	  up	  or	  qualify	  –	  perhaps	  in	  favor	  of	  some	  other	  “greater	  knowledge”.	  The	  more	  radical	  stance	  does	  not	  contradict	  these	  ideas,	  but	  merely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  69/24/96. 
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is	  more	  demanding	   in	  what	   constitutes	   “knowledge”:	   if	  we	   are	   looking	  not	   for	   “greater	  knowledge”	  (from	  some	  particular	  standpoint),	  but	  “great	  knowledge”	  which	  holds	  from	  every	  perspective,	  then	  it	  seems	  very	  likely	  that	  the	  result	  will	  be	  simply	  that	  there	  is	  no	  knowledge,	  and	  that	  all	  talk	  of	  knowledge	  is	  ultimately	  futile.	  Clearly,	   the	   more	   perspectives	   one	   demands	   that	   one’s	   knowledge	   claims	   hold	  from,	  the	  fewer	  the	  things	  one	  can	  legitimately	  claim	  to	  know.	  This	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  process	   of	   progressive	   enlightenment:	   first	   seeing	   the	   highly	   perspective-­‐contingent	  “lesser	   knowledge”	   claims	   to	   be	   unsatisfactory,	   then	   proceeding	   in	   the	   direction	   of	  increasingly	   “greater”	   knowledge	   which	   seemingly	   avoids	   the	   perspective-­‐dependent	  fallacy;	   but	   ultimately	   coming	   to	   realize	   that	  all	  knowledge	   claims	   are	   contingent	   upon	  some	  range	  of	  perspectives. Viewed	   in	   this	  way,	   the	  radical	  stance	   is	   the	  culmination	  of	  the	   ideas	  of	   the	   less	   radical	   stance	   –	   it	  merely	   takes	   these	   ideas	   to	  what	   in	  principle	   at	  least	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  their	  natural	  conclusion. 	   Greater	   knowledge	   also	   seems	   closely	   connected	   to	   other	   Zhuangist	   concepts	  related	  to	  following	  Dao,	  particularly	  the	  two	  related	  concepts	  of	  “clarity”	  (明	  ming)	  and	  the	  “hinge”	  or	  “pivot”	  of	  the	  Dao	  (道樞	  dao	  shu).	  The	  Qiwulun	  draws	  a	  contrast	  between	  the	   petty,	   perspective-­‐dependent	   drawing	   of	   shi-­fei	   distinctions	   from	   one’s	   own	  perspective	   exemplified	   by	   the	   opinionated	   stances	   of	   the	   Confucians	   and	   the	  Mohists,	  who	  “shi	  what	  each	  other	  fei	  and	  fei	  what	  each	  other	  shi”,	  and	  clarity,	  which	  is	  presented	  as	   a	   superior	   stance.45	  In	   the	   course	  of	   this	  discussion,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	   the	  Dao	   is	  obscured	   by	   the	   drawing	   of	   these	   petty	   distinctions,46	  and	   a	   solution	   is	   proposed	   by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  4/2/21-­‐31.	  46	  Referred	  to	  as	  “小成”	  or	  “lesser	  achievements/completion”	  –	  a	  term	  closely	  paralleling	  the	  use	  of	  “小知”	  or	  “lesser	  knowledge”	  to	  refer	  to	  knowledge	  commitments	  to	  such	  distinctions.	  In	  other	  passages,	  “completion”	  is	  explicitly	  tied	  to	  the	  drawing	  of	  shi-­fei	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means	  of	  the	  “pivot	  of	  the	  Dao”.	  The	  description	  of	  the	  pivot	  of	  the	  Dao	  appeals	  to	  the	  two	  general	  perspectives	  of	  “this”	  and	  “that”,	  seeing	  a	  debate	  between	  whether	  something	  is	  “this”	  or	   “that”	  as	  directly	  analogous	   to	   the	  shi-­fei	  debates	  of	   “this”	  and	  “not-­‐this”.47	  The	  text	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  if	  I	  argue	  with	  you	  about	  whether	  some	  thing	  which	  happens	  to	  be	  close	   to	  me	   is	   “this”	   (as	   I	  would	  claim	   from	  my	  perspective)	  or	   “that”	   (as	  you	  would	  from	  yours),	  then	  there	  surely	  is	  no	  fact	  of	  the	  matter	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  thing	  is	  ultimately	  (果	  guo)	  “this”	  or	  “that”.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  same	  may	  be	  true	  in	  cases	  of	  shi-­fei	  –	  people	  may	  be	  arguing	  over	  questions	  that	  simply	  have	  no	  ultimate	  answer,	  because	  they	  depend	  crucially	  upon	  perspective.	  	   The	  pivot	  of	  the	  Dao	  is	  intended	  to	  bring	  clarity	  (明	  ming)	  in	  such	  cases.	  The	  text	  defines	   the	   pivot	   as	   the	   place	   where	   “this”	   and	   “that”	   obtain	   their	   complement.	   Upon	  reaching	   the	   pivot,	   one	   stands	   “in	   the	   centre	   of	   a	   ring,”	   can	   “respond	   endlessly,”	   and	  “endlessly	   shi	  things	   and	  endlessly	   fei	  things”.48	  Putting	   aside	   the	  details	   of	  how	  best	   to	  interpret	   the	  metaphor	   of	   the	   pivot,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   reaching	   the	   pivot	   is	   somehow	  supposed	   to	   allow	   us	   to	   “get	   outside”	   the	   this-­‐that	   or	   this-­‐not-­‐this	   debate	   in	   question.	  From	   the	  pivot,	  we	  do	  not	   simply	   take	  up	  a	   single	   stance	  of	   “this”	  or	   “that”,	   but,	   rather	  than	  denying	  that	  either	  position	  is	  correct,	  or	  taking	  up	  a	  third	  position	  (such	  as	  “there	  are	  no	  this	  and	  that,”	  or	  “this”	  and	  “that”	  in	  no	  way	  exist	  or	  make	  sense),	  the	  point	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  we	  should	  appreciate	  all	  these	  different	  perspectives	  from	  a	  neutral	  standpoint.	  We	  might	  want	   to	   shi	  a	   thing	   in	  one	   case,	   but	   also	   to	   fei	   it	   in	   another	  –	   standing	  at	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  distinctions	  and	  causing	  injury	  to	  the	  Dao.	  See	  Hansen	  2003,	  p.147	  and	  Fraser	  2009,	  448-­‐449. 47	  In	  classical	  Chinese,	  the	  same	  word	  “是	  shi”	  can	  mean	  “so/take	  as	  so”	  and	  “this”,	  and	  so	  appears	  in	  the	  phrasing	  of	  both	  these	  debates	  –	  one	  as	  “彼是”	  one	  as	  “是非”.	  See	  Hansen	  1983,	  p.	  45-­‐46. 48	  4/2/30-­‐31.	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pivot,	  we	  are	  free	  to	  choose	  between	  these	  possibilities	  in	  specific	  cases,	  though	  we	  may	  deny	  that	  any	  one	  stance	  is	  ultimately	  privileged.	  	   Thus	   clarity	   seems	   to	  promote	   a	   type	  of	   understanding	   that	   affirms	   the	   value	  of	  greater	  knowledge,	  and	  explains	  how	   lesser	  knowledge	  should	  be	  viewed.	  Clarity	   is	  not	  attained	   through	   some	   alternative	   means	   or	   capacity	   than	   our	   ordinary	   access	   to	   the	  world	  through	  individual	  perspectives,	  as	  “unblinkered”	  knowledge	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  the	  
Xunzi,	  but	  through	  appreciation	  both	  of	  the	  many	  differing	  perspectives	  that	  are	  available,	  and	  of	   their	   limitations.	   Lesser	  knowledge	   is	   inherently	   flawed	   in	   that	   it	   commits	  us	   to	  something	  that	  is	  so	  only	  from	  a	  range	  of	  perspectives.	  Though	  we	  might	  go	  along	  with	  it	  in	  particular	  cases,	  we	  should	  not	  mislead	  ourselves	  into	  thinking	  it	  is	  ultimately	  correct.	  It	  might	  well	  be	  that,	  for	  a	  particular	  monkey,	  living	  in	  a	  tree	  is	  “the	  right	  place”.	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  deny	  this;	  the	  important	  point	   is	   just	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  tree	  is	  not	  somehow	  universally	  the	  right	  place.	  	  	   This	   line	   of	   interpretation	   supports	   the	   view	   of	   “greater	   knowledge”	   as	  “relativized”	   lesser	   knowledge	   –	   the	   idea	   that,	   even	   though	   we	   may	   be	   committed	   to	  something	  which	  does	  not	  in	  fact	  hold	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  perspectives,	  if	  we	  are	  able	  to	  
see	  that	   it	  does	  not,	   and	  would	  not	   claim	   that	   it	  held	   from	  other	  perspectives,	  we	  again	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  a	  better	  position	  than	  the	  monkey	  who	  claims	  the	  tree	  ultimately	  is	  the	  right	  place,	  or	  the	  Confucian	  who	  insists	  that	  three	  years	  of	  mourning	  is	  the	  right	  funeral	  ritual	  for	  all. 	  
Knowing	  and	  the	  Zhuangist	  ethical	  stance	  
	   The	  opening	  line	  of	  the	  Yang	  Sheng	  Zhu	  chapter	  makes	  the	  point	  that	  while	  our	  life	  is	  limited	  –	  eventually	  we	  must	  all	  die	  –	  there	  is	  no	  corresponding	  limit	  to	  knowledge,	  at	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least	  in	  principle.	  The	  problem	  rather	  is	  that	  we,	  as	  beings	  inevitably	  limited	  by	  our	  finite	  lifespans,	   strive	   to	   attain	   this	   “unlimited	   knowledge”,	   foolishly	   believing	   this	   to	   be	   an	  achievable	  goal.	  This	  in	  turn	  ties	  in	  with	  some	  foundations	  of	  the	  Zhuangist	  ethical	  stance.	  Although	  the	  Zhuangist	  expresses	  skepticism	  that	  one	  might	  know	  what	  it	  is	  that	  all	  things	  take	  as	  
shi	  or	  fei,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  explicitly	  claiming	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  shi	  or	  fei,	  or	  denying	  that	  there	  might	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  be	  some	  things	  which	  all	  things	  do,	  in	  fact,	  take	  as	  shi	  or	  fei,	  but	  rather	  indicates	  a	  skepticism	  about	  our	  ability	  to	  come	  to	  know	  that	  such	   things	   are	   in	   fact	   the	   case.	   The	   same	   emphasis	   on	   our	   finiteness	   and	   inability	   to	  imagine	  everything	  –	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  imagine	  some	  aspects	  of	  what	  it	   is	   like	  to	  be	  a	  monkey,	  or	  a	  fish,	  but	  can	  barely	  conceive	  of	  what	  it	  might	  like	  to	  be	  a	  sage	  –	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  underwriting	  both	  skepticism	  about	  our	  own	  claims	  to	  knowledge	  and	  those	  made	  by	  others.	  Leaving	   aside	   the	   issue	   of	  whether,	   as	  Hansen	   argues,	   skepticism	   actually	   is	   the	  basis	   for	   the	   Zhuangzi’s	   normative	   stance,	   or,	   as	   Fraser	   contends,	   both	   skepticism	   and	  normative	  views	  are	  grounded	   in	  a	  meta-­‐ethical	   theory	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  value,	   there	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  our	  fundamental	  inability	  to	  know	  things	  such	  as	  what	  is	  universally	  right	  at	  least	  strongly	  supports	  the	  Zhuangist	  stance	  of	  ethical	  pluralism.	  If	  we	  cannot	  know	  that	  our	  way	  is	  truly	  better	  than	  anyone	  else’s,	  we	  have	  no	  justification	  for	  forcing	  it	  upon	  others	  –	  even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  there	  might	  indeed	  be	  a	  best	  way.49	  Important	  too	  is	  the	  realization	  that	  the	  skepticism	  involved	  is	  not	  particular	  to	  what	  I	  can	  know,	   but	   to	   what	   anyone,	   short	   of	   the	   fantastic	   sage,	   can	   know.	   The	   realization	   that	  nobody	   can	   know	   the	   universally	   right	  way	  weighs	   in	   favor	   of	  my	   taking	   an	   accepting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  However,	  as	  Fraser	  points	  out,	  skepticism	  about	  our	  ability	  to	  know	  what	  is	  universally	  right	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  alone	  to	  motivate	  tolerance	  of	  others.	  (Fraser	  	  2009,	  p.453).	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stance	  towards	  others	  –	  they	  might	  be	  right,	  or	  I	  might	  be	  right,	  but	  after	  all	  neither	  of	  us	  
knows	  that	  he	  is	  right.	  Chad	   Hansen	   draws	   attention	   to	   a	   further	   issue,	   which	   he	   sees	   as	   being	   a	   key	  motivating	   factor	   of	   the	   Zhuangzi’s	   ethical	   stance:	   the	   problem	   of	   infinite	   regress	   or	  circularity	   in	  giving	   justification	   for	  one’s	  norms.50	  If	  each	  norm	  is	   justified	  by	  appeal	   to	  another	   norm,	   with	   no	   norms	   justified	   in	   any	   other	   way,	   we	   ultimately	   “run	   out”	   of	  justification,	  leaving	  us	  without	  persuasive	  justification	  for	  our	  practices	  except	  in	  terms	  of	  other	  norms	  that	  we	  are	  committed	  to,	  and,	  according	  to	  Hansen’s	  interpretation,	  this	  motivates	   tolerance	   of	   alternative	   schemes.	   On	   the	   present	   interpretation,	   this	   sits	  uneasily	  with	  the	  stance	  of	  the	  text,	  because	  such	  a	  regress	  problem	  of	  justification	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  normative	  claims,	  but	  to	  all	  knowledge	  claims,	  and	  yet	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  there	  are	  knowledge	  claims	  of	  which	  the	  text	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  skeptical.	  However,	  given	  the	   apparent	   interest	   of	   the	   text	   in	   justification	   and	   its	   relevance	   to	   conceptions	   of	  knowledge,	   considering	   how	   such	   a	   regress	   of	   norms	   might	   have	   been	   viewed	   by	   the	  compilers	   of	   the	   Zhuangzi	   may	   be	   of	   use	   in	   better	   understanding	   how	   the	   Zhuangist	  ethical	  stance	  relates	  to	  its	  views	  of	  knowledge.	  Firstly,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   for	   those	   such	   as	   Mohists	   and	   Confucians,	  paradigmatic	  examples	  of	  shi-­fei	  debaters	  against	  whose	  absolutist	  conceptions	  of	  Dao	  the	  
Zhuangzi	   is	   opposed,	   justification	   often	   ends	   in	   appeals	   to	   basic	   goods	   against	   which	  perhaps	   few	   of	   their	   contemporaries	  would	   argue	   –	   order,	   benevolence,	   righteousness,	  and	  so	  on.	  Though	  a	  Confucian	  would	  reject	  the	  suggestion	  that	  benefit	  can	  be	  grounds	  for	  abandoning	  key	  ritual	  practices,	  and	  a	  Mohist	  would	  balk	  at	  the	  suggestion	  that	  rites	  and	  ritual	   can	   be	   justification	   for	   anything,	   appeals	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   something	   “promotes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Hansen	  2003,	  p.143.	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order”	   or	   “encourages	   filial	   piety”	   appear	   in	   principle	   to	   be	   viewed	   as	   acceptable	  justification	  by	  both.	 With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  intractable	  nature	  of	  the	  Confucian-­‐Mohist	  debate	  seems	  to	  be	   due	   less	   to	   the	   two	   having	   radically	   different	   ethical	   outlooks	   grounded	   in	  fundamentally	   opposed	   values,	   than	   that	   their	   systematizations	   of	   their	   views	   –	   their	  proposed	   normative	   ethical	   systems	   and	   the	   justification	   for	   them	   –	   are	   incompatible,	  despite	  being	  grounded	   in	   the	  affirmation	  of	  broadly	  similar	  basic	  goods.	  Thus	   it	  would	  have	  been	  clear	  to	  contemporary	  thinkers	  interested	  in	  the	  debate	  that	  basic	  goods,	  even	  supposing	  we	  are	  all	  be	  able	  to	  agree	  upon	  their	  importance,	  are	  ultimately	  insufficient	  to	  determine	  an	  entire	  ethical	  system	  –	  benevolence,	  righteousness,	  filial	  piety,	  and	  so	  on	  do	  not	  in	  themselves	  determine	  any	  one	  particular	  Dao.	  Many	  of	  the	  same	  basic	  goods	  can	  be	  (and	  indeed	  were)	  appealed	  to	  as	  justification	  for	  Confucianism	  as	  for	  Mohism.	  The	   Zhuangzi	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   does	   appear	   to	   be	   suspicious	   of	   even	   values	  nominally	  shared	  by	  Confucian	  and	  Mohist,	  such	  as	  benevolence	  and	  righteousness.	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  for	  the	  Zhuangzi	  anything	  is	  to	  be	  valued	  in	  anything	  more	  than	  a	  highly	  contingent	  sense.	  If	  the	  Zhuangzi	  claims	  that	  all	  Daos	  are	  equal	  in	  that	  they	  can	  only	  be	  contingently	  justified,	  while	  none	  is	  “ultimately”	  justified,	  we	  are	  quickly	  faced	  with	   the	   “Daoist	   Nazi	   problem”	   –	   the	   claim	   that	   a	   Zhuangist	   can	   produce	   no	   objection	  consistent	   with	   his	   own	   views	   to	   someone	   who	   wishes	   to	   follow	   a	   Dao	   that	   would	  ordinarily	  be	  condemned	  as	  morally	  objectionable,	  such	  as	  a	  “Nazi	  Dao”.51	  We	  can	  imagine	  an	  individual	  who	  devotes	  his	  life	  to	  practices	  that	  most	  of	  us	  would	  consider	  abhorrent	  –	  in	   the	   following	   discussion	   I	   will	   use	   “killing	   innocent	   babies	   for	   fun”	   as	   an	   arbitrary	  example	  of	  such	  an	  activity	  practiced	  by	  the	  hypothetical	  Nazi	  –	  and	  also	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  This	  problem	  is	  discussed	  in	  Hansen	  1992,	  p.	  289-­‐290;	  I	  am	  borrowing	  the	  label	  “Daoist	  Nazi	  problem”	  from	  Chris	  Fraser.	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extremely	  successful	  at	  achieving	  his	  aims.	  The	  worry	   is	   that	  by	  devaluing	  conventional	  morality,	   the	  Zhuangzi	   denies	   us	   the	   possibility	   of	   saying	   that	   either	   such	   a	  Dao	   or	   the	  actions	  of	  such	  a	  person	  are	  in	  any	  sense	  wrong,	  and	  thereby	  ends	  up	  making	  a	  “Nazi	  Dao”	  appear	  no	  less	  legitimate	  than	  any	  other.52	  Certainly	   for	   the	   Zhuangzi,	   even	   fundamental	   values	   and	   basic	   goods	   can	   be	  questioned,	   as	   for	   example	   when	   it	   questions	   whether	   death	   is	   truly	   something	   to	   be	  disvalued.53	  But	  so	  can	  everyday	  knowledge	  claims	  –	  the	  butterfly	  dream	  passage	  clearly	  makes	  problematic	  even	  claims	  such	  as	  “I	  know	  that	  I	  am	  Zhuang	  Zhou”54	  –	  though	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  text	  is	  not	  in	  general	  radically	  skeptical	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  knowledge.	  The	  more	  radical	  strand	  of	  thought	  in	  the	  Zhuangzi	  highlights	  the	  regress	  of	  justification	  that	  Hansen	  points	  out	  –	  however	  this	  type	  of	  regress	  is	  not	  unique	  to	  normative	  claims,	  but	  shared	  by	  all	  knowledge	  claims.	  If	  we	  attempt	  to	  follow	  the	  line	  of	  thought	  of	  the	  less	  radical	  strands	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi,	  we	  will	  presumably	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  justification	  must	  eventually	  stop	  somewhere.	  This	  allows	  us	  to	  accept	  that	  we	  do	  know	  that	  monkeys	  live	  in	   trees	  and	  Zhuangzi	  to	  accept	   that	  he	  knows	  that	  he	   is	  Zhuang	  Zhou.	  But	  can	  this	   less	  radical	  stance	  also	  allow	  us	  to	  suspend	  our	  skepticism	  about	  some	  ethical	  knowledge?	  For	   the	  Zhuangzi,	   the	  problem	  with	  Mohist	   and	  Confucian	  doctrine	   is	   less	   that	   it	  makes	  normative	  claims	  which	  are	  false,	  unjustified,	  wrong,	  or	  go	  against	  some	  “correct”	  Dao	  –	  though	  some	  of	  these	  might	  also	  be	  so	  –	  as	  that	  the	  things	  they	  are	  claiming	  to	  know	  absolutely	   are	   clear	   instances	   of	   “lesser	   knowledge”.	   It	   doesn’t	   matter	   how	   long	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  The	  Mozi	  appeals	  to	  a	  broadly	  similar	  example	  in	  its	  argument	  against	  the	  authority	  of	  conventional	  morality:	  suppose	  there	  is	  a	  state	  in	  which	  it	  is	  the	  custom	  to	  kill	  and	  eat	  one’s	  first-­‐born	  son,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  accepted	  by	  those	  in	  power	  and	  the	  common	  people	  –	  even	  so,	  this	  alone	  would	  not	  make	  such	  a	  practice	  right	  (Mozi	  39/25/75-­‐78).	  The	  related	  “Daoist	  Nazi”	  problem	  is	  that	  a	  Zhuangist	  cannot	  simply	  condemn	  such	  a	  practice	  as	  wrong	  without	  being	  drawn	  into	  the	  very	  sort	  of	  petty	  shi-­fei	  debate	  he	  so	  disdains.	  53	  6/2/80-­‐81.	  54	  7/2/94-­‐96. 
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correct	  mourning	  period	  is	  claimed	  to	  be;	  the	  problem	  is	  with	  claiming	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	   as	   a	   universally	   correct	   mourning	   period	   in	   the	   first	   place,	   and	   that	   we	   could	  somehow	  come	  to	  know	  it.	  Realizing	  that	  such	  a	  thing	  cannot	  be	  known,	  because	  what	  is	  “correct”	   in	   that	  case	  depends	   importantly	  upon	  perspective,	  makes	  us	  strongly	  suspect	  that	   there	  simply	   is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  correct	  mourning	  period	  or	  ritual,	  and	  makes	  us	  suspicious	  of	  those	  claiming	  otherwise.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  there	  is	   no	   immediate	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   this	   must	   necessarily	   be	   the	   case	   for	   all	   claims	  involving	  “correctness”	  or	  normativity,	  since	  the	  source	  of	  doubt	  in	  the	  mourning	  period	  case	  comes	  from	  the	  way	  the	  subjective	  acceptability	  of	  the	  claim	  varies	  with	  individual	  perspective.	   This	   leaves	   open	   the	   possibility	   that	   some	   claims	   as	   to	  what	   is	   correct	   do	  indeed	  hold	  across	  all	  recognizably	  human	  perspectives.	  Such	  claims	  would	  clearly	  have	  to	  be	  very	  different	  to	  the	  petty	  shi	  and	  fei	  of	  the	  Confucians	  and	  Mohists	  –	  indeed,	  they	  would	  have	  to	  be	  claims	  about	  which	  people	  simply	  do	  not	  disagree.	  This	  suggests	  that	  one	  potential	  response	  to	  the	  Daoist	  Nazi	  scenario	  might	  be	  for	  the	  Zhuangist	   to	   simply	  argue	   that	   the	  Nazi	   case	   is	  one	   in	  which	  people	  who	  otherwise	  may	  follow	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  Dao	  have	  such	  overwhelming	  agreement	  that	  the	  Nazi	  is	  in	   the	  wrong	  that	  condemnation	  of	  his	  actions	   is	  no	   less	  correct	   than	  our	  mundane	  and	  uncontroversial	  observation	   that	  monkeys	   live	   in	   trees.	  The	  claim	   that	   “killing	   innocent	  babies	  for	  fun	  is	  wrong”	  might	  be	  an	  example	  of	  a	  normative	  claim	  that	  seems	  so	  obvious	  to	  human	  beings	  that	  we	  accept	  it	  as	  valid	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  we	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  monkeys	  live	  in	  trees	  –	  and	  in	  particular,	  we	  don’t	  see	  it	  as	  importantly	  dependent	  upon	  perspective,	  nor	  do	  ordinary	  people	  see	  it	  as	  requiring	  any	  particular	  justification.55	  Just	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  A	  similar	  case	  –	  that	  of	  our	  instinctive	  reaction	  to	  seeing	  a	  child	  about	  to	  fall	  into	  a	  well	  –	  is	  famously	  cited	  in	  the	  Mengzi	  in	  the	  course	  of	  arguing	  for	  a	  Confucian	  Dao	  (Mengzi	  3.6/18/4-­‐12).	  Perhaps	  the	  Zhuangist	  issue	  with	  such	  claims	  is	  less	  that	  they	  might	  not	  truly	  hold	  for	  everyone,	  but	  that	  even	  supposing	  that	  they	  did	  hold,	  they	  still	  could	  not	  be	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as	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  lunatic	  claiming	  that	  monkeys	  live	  in	  little	  yellow	  submarines	  is	  not	  normally	   considered	  a	   counterexample	   to	   the	   commonsense	   claim	   that	  monkeys	   live	   in	  trees,	   so	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   disturbed	   individual	   who	   sees	   nothing	   wrong	   with	   killing	  innocent	  babies	   for	   fun	  might	  also	  not	  constitute	  a	  genuine	  perspective	   from	  which	   the	  latter	  claim	  fails	  to	  hold.	  	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  seems	  that	  particularly	  in	  view	  of	  the	  Zhuangist’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  range	  of	  available	  or	  possible	  perspectives,	  there	  is	  another	  relevant	  and	  important	  perspective	   which	   we	   must	   consider:	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Nazi	   himself.	   The	   Nazi	  perspective,	   being	   by	   hypothesis	   an	   actual	   perspective,	   is	   surely	   at	   least	   as	   real	   a	  perspective	  as	  that	  of	  the	  sage.	  Yet	  from	  the	  Nazi’s	  own	  perspective,	  again	  by	  hypothesis,	  there	   is	   nothing	  wrong	  with	   killing	   innocent	   babies	   for	   fun,	   and	   so	   a	  wise	   Zhuangist,56	  looking	  at	  things	  from	  as	  many	  perspectives	  as	  he	  can,	  would	  have	  to	  concede	  that	  “killing	  innocent	  babies	  for	  fun	  is	  wrong”	  is	  lesser	  knowledge	  and	  contingent	  upon	  perspective.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	   is	  committed	  to	  such	  a	  radical	  relativism	  about	  value	  that	  it	  simply	  can	  give	  no	  response	  to	  the	  hypothetical	  Nazi?	  I	  think	  that	  here	  there	  are	  still	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Zhuangist	  can	  respond	  without	  needing	  to	  commit	  himself	  to	  knowing	   the	   universal	   “wrongness”	   of	   the	   original	   claim.57	  Firstly,	   the	   Zhuangist	  would	  surely	  point	  out	  that	  knowledge	  itself	  is	  importantly	  limited	  in	  this	  way,	  and	  the	  question	  of	  what	  we	   can	   know	   about	   the	   Nazi	   case	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   particularly	   special.	   The	   vast	  range	  of	  perspectives	  that	  can	  be	  considered	  mean	  that	  we	  cannot	  attain	  great	  knowledge,	  in	  ethical	  and	  non-­‐ethical	  cases	  alike.	  We	  might	  tentatively	  endorse	  the	  claim	  that	  “killing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  any	  one	  particular	  Dao,	  such	  as	  the	  Dao	  for	  which	  Mengzi	  argues,	  because	  they	  could	  equally	  well	  serve	  as	  evidence	  for	  some	  alternative,	  incompatible	  Dao.	  	  56	  By	  “wise	  Zhuangist”	  I	  mean	  someone	  who	  endorses	  the	  views	  on	  lesser	  and	  greater	  knowledge	  as	  interpreted	  here,	  and	  additionally	  values	  “greater	  knowledge”	  over	  “lesser	  knowledge”.	  57	  Here	  I	  am	  following	  the	  approach	  suggested	  in	  Fraser	  2009,	  p.455	  and	  footnote	  41.	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innocent	  babies	   for	   fun	   is	  wrong”,	  since	   it	  does	  appear	  to	  hold	   from	  many	  perspectives,	  but	   this	   alone	   provides	   no	   real	   challenge	   to	   the	   hypothetical	   Nazi	   himself,	   since	   it	   is	  precisely	  from	  his	  perspective	  that	  it	  fails.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Zhuangzi	  has	  nothing	  to	  say	  about	  the	  Nazi	  or	  his	  Dao.	  For	  one	  thing,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  if	  I	  myself	  were	  a	  Zhuangist,	  it	  would	  be	  foolish	  for	  me	  to	  follow	  a	  Nazi	  Dao.	  Committing	  myself	  to	  a	  Dao	  in	  which	   I	   claim	   to	   know	   that	   “killing	   innocent	   babies	   for	   fun	   is	   acceptable”	   for	   instance	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  unwise	  thing	  for	  me	  to	  do	  considering	  that	  such	  claims	  fail	  from	  so	  many	  perspectives	  –	  for	  instance	  from	  those	  of	  the	  babies,	  their	  families,	  and	  virtually	  all	  of	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  perhaps	  possible	  past	  and	  future	  perspectives	  I	  myself	  might	  actually	  occupy.	  Similarly,	  it	  seems	  that	  I	  can	  also	  quite	  consistently	  condemn	  a	  Nazi	  Dao	  follower,	  not	   because	   his	   actions,	   commitments	   or	   Dao	   are	   “wrong”	   in	   any	   absolute	   sense,	   but	  rather	  because	  he	  is	  stupid	  in	  failing	  to	  see	  these	  important	  perspectives	  on	  his	  situation.	  Depending	  upon	  the	  Nazi’s	  other	  beliefs	  and	  commitments,	  a	  skilled	  Zhuangist	  might	  well	  be	  able	  to	  point	  out	  a	  perspective	  that	  the	  Nazi	  himself	  would	  find	  persuasive	  –	  perhaps	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  too	  was	  once	  an	  innocent	  baby	  might	  lead	  him	  to	  question	  his	  actions,	  or	  perhaps	  the	  thought	  of	  his	  own	  offspring	  being	  killed	  for	  fun	  by	  himself	  or	  others	  might	   lead	  him	  to	  reevaluate	  his	  beliefs.	  Thus	   it	   seems	  that	   there	  are	  avenues	  of	  response	  open	  to	  the	  Zhuangist	  that	  avoid	  his	  being	  drawn	  into	  a	  petty	  shi-­fei	  debate	  over	  the	  universally	  correct	  Dao	  and	  its	  justification. Such	   criticism	   is	   necessarily	   weaker	   than	   simply	   condemning	   the	   Nazi’s	   actions	  outright	   –	   this	   is	   an	   inevitable	   consequence	   of	   the	   Zhuangzi’s	   skepticism	   about	   our	  knowledge	  of	  uniquely	  privileged	  perspectives	  and	  ultimately	  correct	  shi-­fei.	  Even	   if	  we	  conclude	  that	  he	  is	  stupid,	  we	  cannot	  completely	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  Nazi’s	  way	   of	   life,	   though	  not	   universally	   right,	  was	   after	   all	   the	   right	  way	   for	  him,	   just	   as	  we	  cannot	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  after	  death	   it	  may	  turn	  out	  that	  we	  have	  been	  wrong	  to	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value	   life	   so	   highly.	   The	  Zhuangzi	  allows	   such	   possibilities,	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   offers	  guidance	  based	  on	  the	  perspectives	  available	  to	  us	  –	  and	  encourages	  us	  to	  think	  about	  and	  reflect	   on	   a	  wider	   range	   of	   them	   than	  we	  might	   otherwise	   do.	   As	  we	   embrace	   a	  wider	  range	  of	  perspectives,	  we	  may	  improve	  our	  epistemic	  position,	  but	  we	  should	  not	  expect	  any	  guarantees	  of	  being	  ultimately	  right.	  	  
Conclusion	  	   The	   skepticism	   in	   the	   Zhuangzi	   does	   represent	   a	   genuine,	   substantive	   skeptical	  position,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  text	  also	  provides	  a	  positive	  methodology	  for	  improving	  our	  epistemic	  position,	  which	   is	  nonetheless	  consistent	  with	   its	  overall	  skeptical	  stance.	  We	   can’t	   know	  what	  everything	  agrees	  on	  –	  but	   if	   our	  knowledge	   is	   such	   that	   it	   can	  be	  agreed	   upon	   from	  more	   perspectives,	   then	   it	   is	   in	   some	   sense	   better	   knowledge.	   The	  knowledge	   that	   creatures	   choose	   to	   live	   in	   environments	   that	   suit	   their	   way	   of	   life	   is	  surely	  better	   than	   the	  knowledge	   that	  a	  monkey	   lives	   in	  a	   tree	  –	  and	   in	  particular,	   it	   is	  much	   better	   than	   the	  mistaken	   claim	   that	   everyone	   should	   live	   in	   a	   tree.	   But	   it	   is	   also	  better	  than	  less	  clearly	  mistaken	  claims,	  such	  as	  that	  everyone	  should	  live	  in	  a	  house	  –	  by	  generalizing	  and	  reflecting,	  we	  can	  come	  to	  see	  why	  we	  are	  tempted	  to	  say	  people	  should	  live	   in	   houses,	   namely	   because	   creatures	   choose	   to	   live	   in	   environments	   that	   suit	   their	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  then	  see	  that	  there	  isn’t	  any	  reason	  why	  someone	  ought	  to	  live	  in	  a	  house	  if	  by	  some	  chance	  doing	  so	  did	  not	  suit	  his	  way	  of	  life.	  This	   may	   be	   one	   factor	   motivating	   Zhuangist	   political	   views.	   As	   Chad	   Hansen	  points	  out,	  the	  main	  task	  of	  political	  theory	  in	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Zhuangzi	  was	  “to	  identify	  the	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wise	   leader	  who	  would	   choose	   to	   impose	  a	   single	  way	  of	   life	  on	  everyone”.58	  But	  being	  “wise”	  or	  “knowledgeable”	  for	  the	  Zhuangzi	  seems	  to	  entail	  precisely	  the	  opposite	  of	  this	  –	  we	  are	  wise	  only	  when	  our	  knowledge	  holds	  from	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  perspectives,	  and	  this	  will	  prevent	  us	  from	  claiming	  to	  “know”	  that	  any	  one	  way	  of	  life	  is	  the	  right	  one,	  so	  long	  as	  we	   can	   imagine	   any	   perspective	   from	   which	   it	   might	   not	   be	   right.	   Being	   wise	   means	  recognizing	  the	  varied	  perspectives	  that	  exist	  –	  and	  so	  realizing	  that	  there	  may	  well	  not	  be	  a	  single	  way	  of	  living	  which	  is	  right	  from	  all	  perspectives.	  In	   conclusion,	   the	  Zhuangzi	   tells	  us	  how	  we	  can	   improve	  our	   epistemic	  position,	  but,	  in	  typically	  Zhuangist	  style,	  it	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  whether	  we	  actually	  should.	  If	  we	  don’t	  follow	   the	   advice,	  we	  will	   surely	   be	   foolish,	   but	   being	   foolish	  might	   not	   be	   such	   a	   bad	  thing.	  In	  any	  case,	  we	  certainly	  cannot	  know	  everything,	  and	  we	  should	  try	  not	  to	  forget	  that	   the	  single-­‐minded	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  could	  easily	  prevent	  us	   from	   living	  a	  good	  life.	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